Inhaltsverzeichnis 1. Einleitung Die richtige Messung ist ein mächtiges Instrument für den sozialen Fortschritt, das falsche oder ungenaue Messung eine Quelle der Gefahr und sogar Verwüstung ist. Der wesentliche Zweck der Wirtschaftstätigkeit ist die Förderung der menschlichen Entwicklung, des Wohlergehens und des Wohlergehens in einer nachhaltigen Weise und nicht des Wachstums wachsen, doch wir haben keine wirksamen Maßnahmen, um die Fortschritte auf diese Ziele zu überwachen. Fortschritte in Verständnis, Theorie und Messung müssen unbedingt Hand in Hand gehen. Ein Begleitartikel in dieser Publikation legt die dringende Notwendigkeit einer neuen Theorie in der Ökonomie dar. Dieser Artikel legt den komplementären Bedarf an neuen Maßnahmen dar. Die Einsätze sind hoch und die Wahl ist unsere. Auf der einen Seite steigende soziale Spannungen, wiederkehrende Finanzkrisen und ökologische Katastrophen auf der anderen Seite die fortschreitende Entfaltung und Entwicklung der menschlichen Fähigkeiten im Einklang mit der Natur. Die Defizite des BIP als Maßnahme werden von führenden Wirtschaftswissenschaftlern Kuznets, Tobin, Tinbergen und vielen anderen gut dokumentiert, aber leider bleibt die Entscheidungsfindung nach wie vor weitgehend auf dem BIP, was in den Jahren 1930-70 gilt, aber heute sicherlich unangemessen ist. Die Herausforderung besteht darin, angemessenere Indikatoren abzuleiten, um das reale, nachhaltige wirtschaftliche Wohlergehen, die soziale Entwicklung und das menschliche Wohlbefinden zu reflektieren. Die Attribute, die das BIP so erfolgreich gemacht haben, werden oft übersehen, es gibt klare Ziele für Politik und Entscheidungsfindung. Wir schlagen einen neuen zusammengesetzten Indikator, HEWI, vor, der zur Entscheidungsfindung dienen kann, der die mit dem BIP verbundenen Stärken beibehält und gleichzeitig seinen Wert als Maßstab für die menschliche wirtschaftliche Entwicklung erhöht. HEWI überwacht den Fortschritt auf Faktoren, die einen bedeutenden Beitrag leisten, um den wirtschaftlichen Konsum der privaten Haushalte, die staatlichen Wohlfahrtsausgaben, die Einkommensungleichheit und die Arbeitslosigkeit sowie die Faktoren, die das Potenzial haben, die langfristige Nachhaltigkeitsbildung, die Energieeffizienz der fossilen Energieträger und die Einsparungen der Netto-Haushaltsmittel deutlich zu verbessern. Der Index wird angewandt, um die Wirtschaftsleistung der ausgewählten Länder von 1985-2005 zu bewerten. 2. Werkzeuge und Maßnahmen Der Mensch unterscheidet sich von anderen Lebensformen durch ihre einzigartige Fähigkeit, Modewerkzeuge zu entwickeln, die unsere Bewusstseinskräfte über die Reichweite unserer Sinne hinaus und unsere Vollmacht über die Grenzen der Kraft, Ausdauer, Raum und Zeit hinausgehen Unsere physischen Körper. Werkzeuge sind ein Instrument für die soziale Evolution. Die Sprache ist ein Werkzeug, das es uns ermöglicht, originale Ideen zu formulieren, unsere innersten Gedanken und Gefühle zu vermitteln, Ereignisse für die Nachwelt aufzuzeichnen, Wissen über die Jahrhunderte zu übertragen und Ideen über weite Weiten von Zeit und Raum auszutauschen. Die Effizienz unserer Werkzeuge ist ein Index unserer sozialen Entwicklung. Messung ist eine weitere bemerkenswerte menschliche Fähigkeit. Viele Werkzeuge erwerben Kraft durch ihre Verwendung in oder Kapazitäten für die Messung, wie der Kalender, Waage, Messstab, Astrolabie, Vermesser Theodolit, Kohlenstoff-Dating und DNA-Fingerprinting. Die Seefahrer Kompass und Chronometer ermöglichten Schiffe, sicher weit weg von Land zu navigieren. Moderne Medizin konnte nicht ohne Thermometer, Stethoskop, Blutdruckmessgerät und Glucometer, zusammen mit Maßnahmen für die Blutzellzahl, Hämoglobin, Cholesterin und unzählige andere Metriken existieren. Heute wird jeder Lebensmittelzutat sorgfältig auf den exakten Nährstoffgehalt gemessen. Geld ist eine der größten Erfindungen der Menschheit. Es ist sowohl ein Werkzeug als auch ein Maß. Aber im Gegensatz zu anderen Maßnahmen, die auf die Messung einer einzigen Dimension oder Qualität beschränkt sind, hat das Geld die Fähigkeit, Wert auf fast alle materiellen oder immateriellen physischen Gegenstände, menschliche Arbeit, sozialer Status, Information, Gehorsam, Loyalität und manchmal sogar Liebe zu vergeben. Coinage ermöglichte es den alten Königreichen, militärische und wirtschaftliche Mächte zu werden, weil sie eine standardisierte Bewertung von Produkten und Dienstleistungen für die Finanzierung und Wartung von riesigen Armeen ermöglichten. Der Begriff der Null war den Griechen und Römern unbekannt. Unabhängig in Indien und Mexiko entwickelt, erreichte es Europa über Arabien nur im 10. Jahrhundert. Man braucht nur versuchen, römische Ziffern hinzuzufügen und zu multiplizieren, um zu erkennen, wie sehr die Einführung von hindu-arabischen Ziffern, die Null und die Dezimalstelle die Fähigkeit zur Buchhaltung und das Wachstum des Handels verstärkt haben. Kombiniert mit doppelter Buchführung, spornten sie die kommerzielle Revolution im 13. Jahrhundert Italien an und erleichterten die genaue Berechnung von Kapital und Gewinn. 1 Die Entwicklung der modernen Wirtschaft wurde durch die kontinuierliche Entwicklung und Verfeinerung von Werkzeugen und Maßnahmen ermöglicht. Das Domesday Book ist eine Aufzeichnung der ersten bekannten Zahlenzählung, die von William I von England im Jahre 1085 durchgeführt wurde, um Ackerland, Viehbestand, Fischerei und andere Quellen des nationalen Reichtums als Grundlage für eine verbesserte Steuererhebung zu identifizieren. Die erste US-Volkszählung wurde im Jahre 1790 durchgeführt. Heute beschäftigt die Ökonomie ein breites Spektrum an unentbehrlichen Messinstrumenten, einschließlich des BIP, des Verbraucherpreisindexes, des Zinses, der Geldmenge, des Wechselkurses und der Arbeitslosenquote. Während die breite Öffentlichkeit diese Werkzeuge als genaue Maßnahmen der ökonomischen Realität betrachten kann, erkennen die Ökonomen, dass sie in Wirklichkeit nur grobe, annähernde Indikatoren sind, die darauf abzielen, die ökonomische Realität zu reflektieren und nicht genau zu messen. Die richtige Messung ist ein mächtiges Instrument für den sozialen Fortschritt, weshalb ständig Anstrengungen unternommen werden, um ihre Kraft und Präzision zu verbessern. Die Atomuhr hat die Sonnenuhr, Sanduhr und Pendel ersetzt. DNA-Fingerprinting hat weitgehend den Handfingerdruck als präzises Mittel zur Identifizierung von Menschen ersetzt. Die globale Satellitennavigation hat den Chronometer überholt. Das 20. Jahrhundert wurde treffend als das Erste Gemessene Jahrhundert in Anerkennung der enormen jüngsten Fortschritte bei der Nutzung der Macht der Messung beschrieben. 2 Phänomenaler wissenschaftlicher und gesellschaftlicher Fortschritt seit dem Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs hat bisher ungeahnte Chancen eröffnet und die Welt auf der Welt entzündet. Heute verfolgt die Menschheit eine gemeinsame Suche nach höheren Lebensstandards, größerer wirtschaftlicher Sicherheit, nachhaltiger Entwicklung, höherem Wohlstand und Wohlbefinden. Seit Jahrzehnten verdeckt die Intensität des Strebens nach einem besseren Leben die Unzulänglichkeit unserer Vorstellungen und unsere Instrumente, um es zu erreichen. Aber in den letzten Jahrzehnten sind wir durch soziale, ökonomische und ökologische Herausforderungen gezwungen, genauere Definitionen zu finden, was wir mit diesen Begriffen und genaueren Werkzeugen zur Messung unserer Fortschritte auf dem Weg zu ihnen erzählen. Soziale und ökonomische Maßnahmen sind untrennbar mit politischen Zielen und der öffentlichen Ordnung verbunden. Es ist nicht nur wissenschaftliche Präzision, dass wir nach, aber leistungsfähigere Instrumente zur Erreichung menschlicher Ziele sind. Falsche oder ungenaue Maßnahmen sind eine Quelle der Gefahr und sogar Verwüstung. Sie können zu einer falschen Politik mit katastrophalen Folgen führen. Als John Kenneth Galbraith in seinem Buch The Great Crash 1929 beobachtete, führte der Mangel an zuverlässigen Maßnahmen in Verbindung mit fehlerhaftem theoretischem Wissen zu Handlungen, die sich eher verschlechterten als die Krise abschwächten. Galbraith zitiert schlechte wirtschaftliche Intelligenz unter fünf Hauptursachen für die Große Depression. Von 1929 bis 1932 war die Politik fast ganz auf der Seite, die Dinge noch schlimmer zu machen. 3 Wurden die realen Risiken, die mit US-Hypotheken-unterstützten Wertpapieren verbunden waren, vor einigen Jahren genauer zugegriffen worden, so könnte die gesamte Subprime-Hypothekenkrise und das daraus resultierende internationale Finanzdefizit vermieden werden. Falsche Maßnahmen können gute Theorie und Praxis untergraben. Richtige Maßnahmen können die Geschwindigkeit des sozialen Fortschritts drastisch verbessern Es sind nicht nur die Ökonomen und Politiker, die neue und bessere Maßnahmen der Ökonomie und des sozialen Fortschritts benötigen. Das machen wir alle. In demokratischen Gesellschaften, in denen normale Bürger durch Information bombardiert und um die beste Politik zu unterstützen, führt das Fehlen klarer, zuverlässiger Maßnahmen des wirtschaftlichen Wohlergehens und des sozialen Fortschritts zu endloser Debatte, Verwirrung, Verschleierung, Anschuldigungen und sogar Verzweiflung. Wie wir vor kurzem erlebt haben, können falsche Maßnahmen zu einem falschen Gefühl der Sicherheit oder Euphorie führen, in dem Moment, in dem die Krise vorbereitet wird. 3. Die Maßnahmen des Nationalen Einkommens Adam Smith, David Ricardo und die anderen großen Gründer der modernen Ökonomie machten bemerkenswerte Beiträge zu unserem Verständnis des Reichtums der Nationen, doch fehlten ihnen wirksame Messungen, um ihre Konzepte präzise anzuwenden. Dies änderte sich dramatisch mit der Entwicklung von quantitativen ökonomischen Maßnahmen nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg. Unter allen Werkzeugen, die zur Messung des wirtschaftlichen Fortschritts entwickelt wurden, hat keiner mehr Aufmerksamkeit und Kontroverse als das BIP und die damit verbundenen Indikatoren, die zur Messung des nationalen und des Pro-Kopf-Einkommens im Laufe der Zeit und in verschiedenen, Länder. Mit dem Beginn der industriellen Revolution verlagerte sich die Konzeption der Wirtschaftsmacht und des nationalen Reichtums von der Landwirtschaft zur industriellen Produktion. Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts wurde es weiter erweitert, um eine breite Palette von materiellen und immateriellen Dienstleistungen zu umfassen. Die Idee, ein solches vielfältiges wirtschaftliches Geschäft in Form eines einzigen gemeinsamen Nenners, Preises zu bewerten, war selbst eine geniale Erfindung, die aber seitdem zu ernsthaften Missverständnissen und politischen Verzerrungen geführt hat. Als Geld ist eines der mächtigsten Instrumente des sozialen Fortschritts, ist der Preis eines der mächtigsten Werkzeuge der Messung. Aber die Versuchung, jeden Wert in Bezug auf den Preis zu messen, spielt mit Mitgefühl, Vernunft und menschlichen Werten. Können wir wirklich den Wert einer antiken Vase, Sammler-Baseball-Karte oder Musik-Erinnerungsstücke mit den Kosten für Nahrung und Medizin, um das Leben von Tausenden von Kindern zu retten Ist eine Milliarde Dollar für militärische Rüstungen wirklich gleichbedeutend mit einer vergleichbaren Investitionen in Bildung oder Öffentlichkeit Gesundheit ist ein zusätzlicher Dollar des Einkommens für die reichsten der Reichen, die dem Betroffenen gleichermaßen gleichwertig sind, und die Gesellschaft im Allgemeinen als ein zusätzlicher Dollar, der von den Ärmsten der Armen verdient wird, ist eine 100 erneuerbare Energie, die im Wert von 100 Nicht - Erneuerbarer fossiler Brennstoff Ist eine Stunde bezahlter Dienstleistungen für das Kochen oder die Reinigung zu Hause wertvoller als eine Stunde unbezahlte Arbeit von Familienmitgliedern Nach dem BIP ist die Antwort auf all diese Fragen ja. Das BIP wurde als Indikator für die Markttätigkeit während der Großen Depression und ein Kriegsplanungsinstrument während des Zweiten Weltkrieges entwickelt, als das primäre Ziel der Regierung war, die industrielle Produktion zu stimulieren. 4 Auf der Grundlage seiner Nützlichkeit während des Krieges wurde es ein offizielles Instrument der US-Wirtschaftspolitik im Jahr 1946. Ursprünglich als ein Index des industriellen Wachstums gedacht, wurde das Wachstum des BIP als Synonym für eine Verbesserung der Nationen wirtschaftliche Gesundheit und das Wohlergehen angesehen Seiner Leute. Sein Schöpfer, Simon Kuznets, warnte den US-Kongress über seine Beschränkungen schon 1934. Das Wohlergehen der Nation kann kaum aus einer Messung des Volkseinkommens wie oben definiert abgeleitet werden. 5 Drei Jahrzehnte später behauptete er die Notwendigkeit, zwischen Quantität und Qualität des Wachstums, der Kosten und der Rückkehr kurz und lang zu unterscheiden. 6 In den frühen 1970er Jahren haben William Nordhaus und James Tobin wieder daran erinnert, dass das BIP nie als Maßstab für Wohlfahrt oder Wohlbefinden gedacht war. 7 In einer seiner letzten Reden summierte Senator Robert F. Kennedy die Grenzen des BIP. Wir können die nationalen Errungenschaften nicht durch das BIP messen, da das BIP Luftverschmutzung, Zigarettenwerbung und Krankenwagen beinhaltet, um unsere Autobahnen nach dem Gemetzel zu löschen. Es zählt spezielle Schlösser für unsere Türen und Gefängnisse für Leute, die sie brechen. Das BIP umfasst die Zerstörung von Mammutbäumen und des Lake Superior. Das BIP wächst mit der Produktion von Napalm und Atomsprengköpfen. Es beinhaltet nicht die Gesundheit unserer Familien, die Qualität ihrer Ausbildung, es ist gleichgültig für die Sicherheit unserer Straßen. Kurz gesagt, das BIP misst alles, außer was das Leben lohnt. 8 Diese Bedenken gingen jedoch weitgehend ungehört, und auch jetzt wird uns täglich gesagt, dass wir unser gegenwärtiges und zukünftiges Wohlergehen in einer Zahl messen müssen, die mehr verbirgt und verzerrt, als es offenbart und klärt. Das BIP ist einfach ein Maß für die Gesamtmenge der fertigen Waren und Dienstleistungen, die im monetisierten Segment der Wirtschaft auf der Grundlage der Kosten geschätzt werden, unabhängig von ihrer relativen Bedeutung oder dem Nutzen für das menschliche Wohlergehen und ohne Unterscheidung zwischen produktiv und destruktiv , Wesentliche und triviale, nachhaltige und nicht nachhaltige Aktivitäten. So sind Erdbeben, Hurrikane, steigende Kriminalität und Scheidungsraten, steigende Ebenen und Kosten von Rechtsstreitigkeiten, Verbreitung von Handgewehren, zunehmende Inzidenz von Epidemieerkrankungen, zunehmender Konsum von Beruhigungsmitteln und gesättigten Fetten, Subprime-Hypotheken und nicht nachhaltige Kreditkartenschulden, chemische Verschmutzung, Erschöpfung Der nicht erneuerbaren Ressourcen, der Militärausgaben und des all-out-Krieges sind von dieser Maßnahme nicht von steigender Beschäftigung, Bildung, Gesundheit und Sicherheit, sauberer Luft und Wasser, besserer Wohn - und Ernährungs - und Ruhesicherheit zu unterscheiden. Das BIP ist einfach ein Brutto-Maß für die Gesamtleistung, die Marktaktivität, das Geld, das die Hände wechselt. Lange erachtete eine technische Frage der Sorge nur für die Ökonomie, ist es jetzt offensichtlich, dass schlechte Maßnahmen zu einer schlechten und sogar katastrophalen Politik führen können, ebenso wie eine unrechtmäßige Behandlung, die sich aus einer fehlerhaften medizinischen Diagnose ergibt, eine leichte Störung in eine tödliche Krankheit umwandeln kann. 9 Wichtige Determinanten des menschlichen Wohlergehens und des Wohlbefindens sind zu wichtig, um als bloße technische Fragen angesehen zu werden. Es ist sowohl unglücklich als auch ironisch, dass selbst die breite Öffentlichkeit so viel Vertrauen in diesen unzureichenden und irreführenden Index des nationalen Fortschritts gelegt hat, dass die Menschen jeden Anstieg des BIP feiern, auch wenn ihr persönlicher Lebensstandard in Wirklichkeit deutlich zurückgegangen ist. Aspirationen für ein besseres Leben sind so universell geworden, dass die Menschen überall leicht Stolz und Zufriedenheit in der realen oder falschen Sinn der nationalen Leistung in den Zahlen spiegeln. Die jüngste Geschichte der Debatte über das BIP ist zu umfangreich und häufig zitiert, um die Einbeziehung hier zu rechtfertigen. Bevor wir andere Optionen untersuchen, können wir einfach die herausragenden Bedenken zusammenfassen, die bei der Suche nach angemesseneren Alternativmaßnahmen angesprochen werden müssen. 1. Das BIP unterscheidet nicht zwischen Faktoren, die zum sozialen Fortschritt beitragen, und solche, die sie tatsächlich beeinträchtigen oder ihren Rückgang widerspiegeln können. Das BIP behandelt Naturkatastrophen, Scheidung, Verbrechen und Krieg als wirtschaftliche Vorteile, z. B. Die massiven Ausgaben zur Beseitigung der menschlichen Krise und der beschädigten Infrastruktur im Zusammenhang mit dem Hurrikan Katrina oder den steigenden Kriminalitätsraten, die die öffentlichen Ausgaben für Sicherheitsmaßnahmen, Strafverfolgung und Gefängnisse erhöhen. Es handelt sich um parallele Investitionen in Humankapital, wie diejenigen, die das Ausbildungsniveau erhöhen, mit Ausgaben, die einen Rückgang der menschlichen Wohlfahrt widerspiegeln, wie etwa der steigende Bedarf an psychiatrischen Dienstleistungen oder Scheidungsrechtsgebühren. 2. Das BIP, ein Maß für die Aktivität, fließt, wird falsch als Maß für Reichtum, Bestände interpretiert. Höhere Niveaus des BIP-Wachstums können und sind oft begleitet von steigenden finanziellen Schulden oder Erschöpfung der natürlichen Vermögenswerte, wie in Zeiten des Krieges, übermäßige Staatsausgaben oder Haushalts-Kreditaufnahme. 3. Das BIP umfasst einige Formen der Wirtschaftstätigkeit, die mehr Kapital verbrauchen als sie erzeugen. Der Konsum von nicht erneuerbaren Ressourcen erzeugt einen Fluss, indem er einen unersetzlichen Vermögenswert verbraucht. Krieg erhöht die Produktion und fließt für eine Aktivität, die tatsächlich zerstört die Produkte zusammen mit anderen natürlichen und sozialen Formen des Kapitals produziert. Wie ein Unternehmen ohne Bilanz, um zwischen Investitionen und Ausgaben, Asset-Erstellung und Asset-Zerstörung zu unterscheiden, ist das BIP praktisch blind für diese Unterscheidungen. 4. Das BIP unterscheidet nicht zwischen nachhaltigen und nicht nachhaltigen Aktivitäten. Es behandelt die Erschöpfung des natürlichen Kapitals und die Kosten, die mit der Entschädigung als Einkommen verbunden sind. Steigende Konsumniveaus führen nicht zwangsläufig zu einem höheren Wirtschafts - oder Wohlfahrtsniveau, wie in dem Fall, in dem die sinkende Qualität der öffentlichen Wasserversorgung die Nachfrage nach kostspieligerem Flaschenwasser verlangt oder die Verbrechung verlängert, die steigenden Ausgaben für die persönliche und kommerzielle Sicherheit erforderlich machen . 5. GDPcapita ist ein Maß für die nationale Produktivität, nicht für den persönlichen Verbrauch oder für das wirtschaftliche Wohlergehen der Haushalte. Es berücksichtigt den Wert aller Finanztransaktionen zu Marktpreisen, einschließlich der Ausgabenkategorien wie der Militärausgaben und der allgemeinen Verwaltung, die nicht direkt mit dem Haushaltseinkommen und den Ausgaben zusammenhängen. 6. Das BIP ignoriert die Auswirkungen der Arbeitslosigkeit auf die menschliche Sicherheit und das Wohlergehen. 7. Das BIP berücksichtigt die Einkommensverteilung nicht. Daher können die durchschnittlichen Pro-Kopf-BIP-Zahlen die Tatsache verbergen, dass das Wachstum für einen wesentlichen Teil der Gesellschaft flach oder sogar negativ sein kann, während es für einen kleinen Teil der Bevölkerung in der höchsten Einkommensgruppe exponentiell ansteigt. 8. Das BIP unterscheidet zwischen spekulativen Gewinnen an den Finanzmärkten während einer Blasenwirtschaft und echten Gewinnen aus zunehmender Beschäftigung, Produktion und persönlichem Verbrauch. 9. Das BIP ignoriert die nichtmarktwirtschaftliche und gemeinschaftliche Wirtschaft, indem sie der Hausarbeit und den freiwilligen Diensten einen Nullwert verleiht, während sie für die gleichen Tätigkeiten einen positiven Wert auf die gleichen Tätigkeiten ausüben. Einer der Gründe, dass das BIP so ungeeignet ist wie ein Lebensqualität-Index, ist seine Unfähigkeit, den Wert der Erziehung, der häuslichen Pflege und der Heimschulbildung, der Hausarbeit, der Freiwilligenarbeit und anderer Formen von nicht monetarisierten Aktivitäten, die für Einzelpersonen von unschätzbarem Wert sind, zu berücksichtigen Und Gesellschaft-an-große. 10. Das BIP und andere preisbasierte Indizes unterschätzen eine reale Verbesserung des Lebensstandards und der Lebensqualität, weil sie nur die Kosten für Waren und Dienstleistungen messen und dabei die tatsächlichen und oftmals erheblichen Verbesserungen der Produktqualität und Lebensqualität ignorieren. Diese Gewinne ergeben sich aus echten Fortschritten in der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung, einschließlich Fortschritte in Wissenschaft und Technik, Verbesserungen in der sozialen Organisation, z. B. Das Internet und die Globalisierung. 4. Notwendigkeit für neue Theorie So bedeutend wie es ist, die Debatte über das BIP und andere Maßnahmen maskiert ein tieferes und weit wichtigeres Thema. Denn wenn man versucht, eine angemessenere Maßnahme für den wirklichen menschlichen Fortschritt zu erreichen, so stellt er den grundlegenden Zweck der Wirtschaftstätigkeit und die grundlegenden Voraussetzungen, auf denen die moderne Wirtschaftstheorie basiert, in Frage. Theorie und Messung gehen Hand in Hand. Ohne Klangtheorie können Maßnahmen zu irreführenden Schlussfolgerungen führen. Auch große Köpfe können in passender Theorie und Messung fehlschlagen. Aristoteles, vielleicht der größte Philosoph und Wissenschaftler, der je gelebt hat, hat es nicht geschafft, die Bewegung richtig zu messen. Obwohl ein ausgezeichneter experimenteller und scharfsinniger Beobachter, seine falsche Prozedur für die Messung der Bewegung stoppte die Entwicklung der physikalischen Wissenschaften für über tausend Jahre, was Russell dazu veranlasste, Aristoteles als das größte Hindernis in der Geschichte der Wissenschaft zu verurteilen. Würde Aristoteles die Bewegung besser verstanden haben, wenn er Zugang zu mehr oder besseren Informationen über die Form, die Farbe und die Zusammensetzung der fallenden Objekte hatte. Einige dieser Daten wären nützlich gewesen, aber das eigentliche Problem war, dass Aristoteles eine notwendige Abstraktion fehlte Führen Sie ihn zum Verständnis der Bewegung. Es fehlte ihm die Grundlage für die zugrunde liegende begriffliche Theorie. Der Erfolg der Physik und der Lebenswissenschaften ist heute in präzisen und adäquaten Messungen mit der Klangtheorie verheiratet. Messungen erzeugen oft paradigmatische Veränderungen in unserem Naturverständnis und wiederum beeinflussen diese Veränderungen die Bedeutung und den Prozess der Messungen. Wie die Autoren in einem gesonderten Artikel in dieser Ausgabe ausgearbeitet haben, sucht die Ökonomie nach dem Bemühen, die Strenge der Naturwissenschaften zu erreichen, für unpersönliche universelle Prinzipien, die wirtschaftliche Systeme regeln. Nicht nur in seinen Annahmen, sondern auch in den erklärten Zielen setzt die Ökonomie zu oft alle Marktaktivitäten mit menschlichem Wohlergehen und Wohlbefinden ein. So sind sowohl die ökonomische Theorie als auch die Messung den gleichen Einschränkungen unterworfen. Dieser Ansatz muss zwangsläufig durch die Entwicklung eines humanitätsorientierteren Ansatzes der Wirtschaftswissenschaft ergänzt werden. In dem Bemühen, die wertlose Objektivität zu erreichen, die mit der physikalischen Wissenschaft verbunden ist, haben die letztgenannten Sozialwissenschaftler die Tatsache übersehen, dass das BIP selbst auf inhärent subjektiven Urteilen beruht und Kriminalität und Krieg mit mehr Nahrung und besserem Wohnraum, verschmutzungsgefährdeten fossilen Brennstoffen gleichgesetzt wird Saubere, erneuerbare Energie. Gleichzeitig weist das BIP den nicht monetarisierten Aktivitäten, die das Wohlergehen fördern, wie die Betreuung von Kindern und älteren Menschen, oder Freizeit - und Familienbeziehungen, die das Wohlbefinden verbessern, einen Nullwert zu. Alle menschlichen Aktivitäten sind zielorientiert und wertorientiert und daher muss die einzige sinnvolle Maßnahme eine sein, die diese Ziele und Werte bewusst anerkennt und bewertet, inwieweit die Wirtschaftstätigkeit sie erreicht. Ein wahrer Fortschritt in der Messung muss auf einem entsprechenden Fortschritt in der zugrunde liegenden Theorie beruhen. So sind wir gezwungen, am Anfang das scheinbarste Schreibenschreiben zu fragen, nämlich was ist der Zweck der Wirtschaft und der Wirtschaftstätigkeit Welche Rolle spielt sie in der menschlichen Existenz, der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung und der Evolution. Die offensichtlichste Antwort ist sicherlich die vernünftigste Und akzeptabel Ziel der Wirtschaftstätigkeit ist es, das Wohlbefinden und das Wohlbefinden zu verbessern. Wenn Kuznets und andere zutreffend sind, dass die Wirtschaftspolitik, die auf dem BIP basiert, zu oft andere Ziele verfolgt, die anders sind und sogar mit dem menschlichen Wohlergehen und dem Wohlbefinden unvereinbar sind, dann gibt es eine volle Rechtfertigung für dringende Bemühungen, sowohl neue Theorie als auch neue Maßnahmen zu entwickeln Umorientierte Ökonomie zu ihrem wahren Zweck. Der Begleiter Artikel Reichtum der Nationen revisited untersucht die Notwendigkeit für neue Theorie. 10 Der Rest dieses Artikels konzentriert sich auf die Notwendigkeit neuer Maßnahmen. 5. Maßnahmen und Indikatoren Es müssen zwischen Maßnahmen und Indikatoren unterschieden werden. In den physikalischen Wissenschaften sind wir gewohnt, materielle physikalische Parameter wie Distanz, Masse, Geschwindigkeit, Frequenz und Wellenlänge zu messen. Aber in den Sozialwissenschaften eignen sich viele der Parameter, die wir messen wollen, nicht der einfachen Quantifizierung. Während die meisten physischen Ereignisse in Bezug auf einige Parameter genau beschrieben werden können, sind menschliche Aktivitäten für eine vollständige Kategorisierung viel zu komplex. Die menschlichen Ereignisse sind viel komplexer, weil sie nicht nur durch physikalische Parameter in Zeit und Raum beeinflusst werden, sondern auch durch soziale, kulturelle, politische und psychologische Faktoren, die oft schwer zu erkennen und unmöglich direkt zu messen sind, wie die Entscheidung, ob zu kaufen Eine echte Prada Ledertasche aus dem Laden oder eine passable Nachahmung von einem Straßenverkäufer um ein Drittel des Preises. Deshalb müssen wir in den Sozialwissenschaften oft nach effektiveren Methoden suchen, um die Komplexität der sozialen Realität zu messen. Vor dreißig Jahren kämpfte Indien mit der Aufgabe, den Fortschritt von 600 Millionen Einwohnern in 575.000 Dörfern und mehr als 10.000 Städten und Städten zu messen. Trotz der umfangreichen öffentlichen Investitionen und der Kreditaufnahme aus dem Ausland, nach traditionellen Maßnahmen auf der Grundlage des Pro-Kopf-BIP in konstanten Dollars, hatte das Land seinen Pro-Kopf-Lebensstandard von nur 27 zwischen 1960 und 1980 erhöht. Im Vergleich dazu erhöhte Frankreich seine per Capita BIP um 109, Korea um 190 und Japan um 237 im gleichen Zeitraum. Angesichts der sehr niedrigen Basis und der steigenden Erwartungen nach der Unabhängigkeit, zeigte sich die Indias-Performance nicht zufriedenstellend. Indias-Führung war verwirrt und entmutigt durch das relativ langsame Tempo des Fortschritts. Intuitiv fühlten sich viele, dass die von ihnen getroffenen Maßnahmen für den nationalen Fortschritt wesentlich waren, doch nach den verfügbaren ökonomischen Maßnahmen waren sie ein düsteres Versagen gewesen. Dann dokumentierte eine Studie im Jahr 1980 große Gewinne, die sich nicht vom BIP widerspiegelten. Es wies darauf hin, dass seit der Unabhängigkeit infolge einer verbesserten öffentlichen Gesundheit mehr als 80 Millionen Menschen leben, eine gleichwertige Bevölkerung wie die wiedervereinigte Deutschland. Wenn das Erhalten von 80 Millionen Menschenleben nicht Fortschritte ist, dann ist das erste Ergebnis dieser bemerkenswerten Errungenschaft, das Pro-Kopf-BIP-Wachstum zu verdünnen und damit den Eindruck zu erwecken, dass das Land nirgends oder gar rückwärts ging. Die Studie stellte auch fest, dass die Lebenserwartung um 60 gestiegen war, die Säuglingssterblichkeit um ein Drittel sank, und die Alphabetisierung hatte sich seit 1950 mehr als verdoppelt. Die Gesamtzahl der Schulen und Hochschulen hatte sich fast verdreifacht. Die Grundschulregistrierung hatte sich vervierfacht. Die Zahl der Krankenhausbetten hatte sich verdreifacht Die Inzidenz von Malaria war von 75 Millionen Fällen auf 100.000 und Todesfälle, die auf die Krankheit von 800.000 auf nur eine zurückzuführen. Elektrizität war zum ersten Mal für Hunderte von Millionen Menschen zur Verfügung gestellt worden. Ein Land, das drei Millionen Menschen zur Hungersnot im Jahr 1943 verlor und 10 Millionen Tonnen importierte Lebensmittelkörner benötigte, um eine weitere massive Hungersnot in den späten 1960er Jahren zu vermeiden, hatte seine Nahrungsmittelproduktion um zweieinhalb Mal erhöht und in den Nahrungsmittelkörnern autark. Pro-Kopf-Nahrungsmittelkonsum war gestiegen 25. Das indische Beispiel hebt den entscheidenden Bedarf an zusätzlichen und alternativen Methoden hervor. Es bringt auch einen grundlegenden Unterschied zwischen Wirtschaftswachstum und sozialer Entwicklung in den Fokus. In Anerkennung der dringenden Notwendigkeit für genauere Möglichkeiten, um die nationalen Fortschritte zu beurteilen, begann das Land eine Suche nach Alternativen. Um eine zuverlässigere Grundlage für die Politikgestaltung und Bewertung zu erhalten, hat die indische Regierung 107 Indikatoren für die Entwicklung zur regelmäßigen Überwachung auf lokaler und nationaler Ebene identifiziert. 11. 12. 13 Häufige körperliche Erhebungen des gesamten Territoriums und der Bevölkerung zur Messung des tatsächlichen Lebensstandards waren unerschwinglich teuer. Anstatt sich nur auf direkte Maßnahmen wie Alphabetisierung, Lebenserwartung und Säuglingssterblichkeit zu verlassen, schlug die Studie vor, nach Parametern zu suchen, die mit steigenden Lebensstandards korrelierten. Zum Beispiel zeigten internationale Vergleiche, dass die steigenden Einkommensniveaus eng mit dem steigenden Zuckerverbrauch korrelierten. Auch in Indien war der zunehmende Verbrauch an gesüßten Lebensmitteln und Getränken zu den ersten beobachtbaren Veränderungen, die mit dem wachsenden Wohlstand verbunden waren. Auf dieser Basis postulierten die Forscher, dass der steigende Zuckerverbrauch einen Bestandteil eines leicht messbaren Index des steigenden Lebensstandards unter den Armen in den ländlichen Gebieten in Indien bilden könnte. Der Zuckerindex wurde nie verabschiedet, aber er illustriert die Unterscheidung zwischen direkten Maßnahmen, die uns über die Leistung einer bestimmten Variablen und Indikatoren, die als Reflexionen der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung genommen werden können, erzählen. Eine Messung ist ein präzises Mittel zur Bewertung eines Phänomens auf einem festen Maßstab von Werten, während ein Indikator ein indirektes und ungenaues Beurteilungsmaß durch Beobachtung oder Messung von Änderungen in einer oder einer Gruppe von verwandten Variablen ist, Ein breiteres Feld des Phänomens. Eine erhöhte Herzfrequenz ist eher ein Indikator als ein Maß an Gesundheit. Es kann stark variieren mit zunehmenden körperlichen Aktivität und Stress sowie mit dem Beginn der Herzkrankheit. Von sich aus sagt es uns sehr wenig, aber wenn es mit anderen Beobachtungen korreliert, kann es als nützlicher Index der Herzgesundheit dienen. 6. Merkmale eines erfolgreichen Indikators In unserem Eifer, ein akzeptableres Maß an menschlichem Fortschritt zu finden, lassen wir die bemerkenswerten Merkmale, die das BIP so erfolgreich und anpassungsfähig gemacht haben, nicht aus den Augen verlieren. Das Genie des BIP ist, dass es alle wirtschaftlichen Aktivitäten in Bezug auf einen gemeinsamen Nenner, Preis oder Währung Wert ausdrückt. Bei Bereinigung um Preisänderungen aufgrund der Inflation ermöglicht dies Vergleiche im Zeitablauf. Wenn sie sich auf Unterschiede in den Lebenshaltungskosten in verschiedenen Ländern beruht, erlaubt sie Vergleiche zwischen den Ländern. Basierend auf Daten, die auf nationaler Ebene leicht gesammelt werden, erleichtert es eine rechtzeitige Messung. Einfachheit, Universalität, Benutzerfreundlichkeit und Aktualität sind große Stärken, die nicht leicht verworfen werden sollten. Das BIP hat auch eine symbolische Fähigkeit zur präzisen Angabe von Veränderungen in den zugrundeliegenden Feldern, die er misst, wie Konsumausgaben, Wohnraum, Elektronik, Transport und Kommunikation. In Fairness müssen wir auch erkennen, dass der Indikator nicht für seine weit verbreitete Fehlanwendung und Fehlinterpretation fehlen kann. Das ist der Fehler derer, die sich falsch anwenden und interpretieren. Das BIP spielt als Indikator für kurzfristige Veränderungen der Wirtschaftstätigkeit eine Rolle. Unsere Herausforderung besteht darin, angemessenere Indikatoren abzuleiten, um das reale und nachhaltige wirtschaftliche Wohlergehen, die soziale Entwicklung und das Wohlergehen der Menschen zu reflektieren. Das BIP war niemals beabsichtigt, Dabei sollten wir den Fehler derjenigen vermeiden, die das BIP derzeit als eine wirksame zusammengesetzte Maßnahme betrachten. Der Versuch, alle Dinge mit einer einzigen Maßnahme zu erreichen, entweder einfach oder komplex, ist eher zu verwirren als zu klären. Der Erfolg des BIP über mehr als ein halbes Jahrhundert ist ein überzeugendes Argument für Einfachheit und Universalität. Seine größte Schwäche war der Versuch, zu viel mit zu wenig zu tun, um Zuverlässigkeit und Bedeutung weit über das hinauszugehen, was die Zahl wirklich sagt, eine Quelle der schlechten Politik und großer Schaden für die Gesellschaft. Der rationellste Ansatz ist es, mit einer klaren Vorstellung von den Zielen, die wir erreichen wollen, und einem gültigen theoretischen Rahmen zu beginnen, der die zugrunde liegenden Prozesse beschreibt, die zu diesem Ergebnis beitragen, dann Maßnahmen erarbeiten, die in der Lage sind, unsere Fortschritte bei der Erreichung dieser Ziele zu überwachen. Klarheit der Konzeption ist die einzige fundierte Grundlage für eine präzise Messung. Solange das Wirtschaftswachstum an sich das wichtigste soziale Ziel war, wie es während der industriellen Revolution, der Großen Depression und des Zweiten Weltkriegs war, hat das BIP eine vernünftige Aufgabe als Überwachungsinstrument gemacht. Aber die Ziele der 1930er Jahre sind nicht unsere gegenwärtigen Ziele, denn wir erkennen jetzt, dass ein ungehindertes Wachstum zu einer ökologischen Katastrophe führen würde. Gleichzeitig müssen wir hinreichend objektiv sein, um zuzugeben, dass vieles von dem, was wir messen möchten, vorerst über unsere Fähigkeiten hinausgehen kann, sei es, weil die benötigten Daten nicht verfügbar sind, nicht genügend genau ist oder einfach nur zu subjektiv ist auf. Wie wir gesehen haben, ist auch die Festlegung von Maßnahmen für die relativ geradlinige Konzeption des Wirtschaftswachstums mit Schwierigkeiten verbunden, was zu Maßnahmen führt, die Aktivitäten betreffen, die das Gegenteil von dem Ziel sind, das wir begehren. Wenn es um Maßnahmen der sozialen Entwicklung, der Nachhaltigkeit, des menschlichen Wohlergehens und des Wohlergehens geht, ist die Herausforderung noch größer. Demut ist immer eine Tugend, aber niemals mehr als in der Absicht, die Erfüllung menschlicher Bestrebungen zu messen. Es ist klüger, weniger zu versuchen, mit zu beginnen und es gut zu tun, als alles zu versuchen und es so unzureichend zu tun, dass es wenig Nutzen dient. In either case, it is important to recognize both what is included and what is excluded in each formulated measure. 7. The Problem of Value Before examining alternative approaches to the measurement of social progress, it may be useful to consider some of the factors that pose serious obstacles to the quantification of economic growth, sustainable development, welfare and well-being. 7.1 Uncertainty amp Risk The importance of the linkage between theory and measurement is most powerfully illustrated by Orio Giarinis challenge to traditional measures as set forth in Dialogue on Wealth and Welfare (1980) and Limits to Certainty (1993). 14. 15 There he highlights fundamental differences between the industrial model of economy that emerged with the Industrial Revolution and the modern service economy which has emerged post 1970. His central thesis is that methods for measuring the value of manufactured goods are inappropriate for measuring the value of many types of services, emphasizing that even in the manufacturing sector 80 of what we regard as production cost now also consists of service activities. In this way he challenges the adequacy of GDP as a measure of economic growth, when applied to the valuation of basic services such as health care, insurance, education, RampD, etc. Can the value of longer life expectancy and better health, higher levels of education, greater social security be adequately evaluated in terms of the cost of production and delivery In Limits to Certainty, Giarini argues that value in the new economy is probabilistic, rather than deterministic, because it involves new types of risk and far greater degrees of complexity, vulnerability and uncertainty. Cost in manufacturing is measured at the stage up to the point of final sale. Whereas in regard to services the actual cost of full delivery may not be known until long after the sale. This is most obviously the case with regard to various forms of insurance, but it applies also to the cost of fulfilling on-going product and service obligations. Toyotas worldwide recall of more than nine million vehicles in 2009-10 equal in quantity to 90 of total light vehicle sales in the USA in 2009 cost the company and its dealers upwards of 4 billion. Hurricane Katrina is estimated to have cost upwards of 200 billion. This includes 120 billion in insured catastrophic losses, but does not include the significant increase in the cost of home insurance that affected all US homeowners in the years following the disaster. 16 Human error has recently proven far more costly than the most violent acts of nature. The losses associated with Katrina are dwarfed by the costs associated with the collapse in value of mortgaged-back securities following the subprime crisis, an instance in which the linkage between the theory of value and its measurement is transparent and direct. Between July 2007 and June 2008, rating agencies lowered the credit ratings on these securities by 1.9 trillion. Indeed, many regard wrong valuation as the principal cause of the crisis. Valuation errors led to bad policy and bad business decisions on an inconceivable scale. Residential properties in the US declined in value by more than 5 trillion or 32 in the following year. The value of retirement assets and other investment assets dropped by more than 8 trillion. 17 Of course, both the potential costs and inherent uncertainty associated with the consequences of current economic activities on climate change are considerably greater. These examples illustrate the magnitude of uncertainty and systemic risk inherent in the modern service-based economy in which contractual obligations of the seller as well as the uncertainties of the buyer may extend long after the date of sale, throughout the entire life cycle of utilization and even disposal. This view challenges the fundamental notion of price based on the equilibrium between supply and demand as an adequate measure of value. And it goes to the heart of the question, What do we really mean by value The ingenious device of equating price with value has served as the basis for the entire development of modern mathematical economics as a science, yet all the major objections to GDP as an indicator of human welfare and well-being point to the inadequacies, gross distortions, disastrous policy measures and catastrophic consequences that can arise from implicit faith in this equation. This perspective, which highlights the linkage between theory and measurement, reinforces the need for more fundamental reassessment of economic theory as proposed in the companion article Wealth of Nations Revisited. Evolving measures to adequately reflect risk and uncertainty is a formidable challenge for the future of economics. In section 10.4 below we illustrate one approach to this challenge in formulating an index for sustainable energy efficiency. 7.2 Price and Quality GDP measures social progress in terms of an increase in the total transaction value of goods and services at market prices. Price is a powerful tool for measurement, but it can also introduce gross distortions for the simple reason that price is an inadequate measure of value. Can we really place a dollar value on an extra hour of leisure A college education A cataract operation that restores eyesight to the elderly An extra year of human life GDP and other price-based indices grossly understate real improvements in living standards and quality of life, because they measure only the cost of goods and services, while ignoring real and often substantial improvements in product quality and quality of life. These gains accrue from real advances in social development, including advances in science and technology, improvements in social organization, e. g. the Internet, and globalization. Differences in product quality can cause gross distortions in the measurement of inflation and the price deflators used to compare GDP growth over time. The price of a mans shirt in USA is about the same as it was fifty years ago in current dollars as a result of world trade, which represents a decline in price of 80 in constant dollars. Efforts to measure social progress over time are also impeded by radical changes in the quality of goods, services, jobs and life in general. A 1920 Model-T Ford and 2010 Mercedes or Lexus are both cars, but in other ways they are far from equivalent. Traveling across the USA on horseback in five months or by car or train in five days or plane in five hours are all forms of transportation, but the difference between them cannot be reduced simply to measures of speed and cost. Because of technological advances, a long distance telephone call from USA to India, which cost 1.50 minute in 1975, equivalent to 4.50 today, is now virtually free over Skype and other VOIP services. Similarly, the price of personal computers has declined 90 in real terms since 1990, while their speed has increased 1000 fold and storage capacity 10,000 fold. Advance in social development leads to enhancements in the quality of life which are very difficult to quantify or reduce to monetary terms. These qualitative dimensions are linked to rising levels of education, greater social security provided by private and government-funded insurance programs, improved medical treatment and public health, new forms of entertainment, machines that reduce physical labour, and many other types of comfort and convenience. It is impossible to value in terms of price the impact on quality of life resulting from antibiotics, year-round access to a full range of fruits and vegetables from all over the world, email, the Internet, on-line education and training, social networking, global access to a free encyclopedia like Wikipedia, e-books, i-Pods, cell phones, ATMs, improvements in the quality of automobiles, and countless other social and technological innovations of the past few decades. The nature and quality of employment required to achieve economic security has also changed dramatically. Manual labor on farms and in factories has been largely replaced by white collar categories of employment which are less physically demanding. In the USA, for example, professional, technical, managerial and other categories of white collar employment rose from 24 to 75 of total employment between 1910 and 2010, while employment in crafts, manual labor, farming, mining and household services declined from 76 to 25. Workers engaged in farm labour fell from 18 to under 1. Nearly 25 of all workers in the USA are now engaged in professional, technical and related activities. These qualitative changes continue. In addition, the qualitative value of employment cannot be assessed strictly in terms of physical working conditions, type of labour or compensation. Types of employment differ widely in terms of the social status and self-esteem they carry, a major reason why the more highly educated shun even undemanding, well-paying jobs that they deem beneath their social status. In our effort to scrupulously account for hidden costs such as environmental degradation and social problems, we should not err in the opposite direction by overlooking the enormous hidden gains that have accrued to the entire society. 8. What Are we Trying to Measure GDP and similar measures may be very useful tools for monitoring short term changes in industrial activity over the course of a few years, but they are grossly inadequate to reflect the complex structural changes that occur during the process of social development and the longer term implications and sustainability of the present mode of economic activity. As Giarini reminds us, like other man-made powerful tools, financial information can be either positive or negative, depending on the values it is used to express. The production of powerful tools is one thing, but the definition of their goals and their positive utilization is a matter of human choice and responsibility. 18 Thus, before evaluating the utility of any specific measure, we must be as clear as possible about what those objectives actually are. This naturally raises the question, what are we trying to measure A very wide range of individual indicators are now being monitored which purport to reflect economic and social progress. The OECD regularly monitors indices relating to fertility rates, migration, marriage and divorce, education, unemployment, income inequality, gender wage gaps, social spending, old age replacement rates, poverty, life expectancy, health expenditure, birth weight, infant mortality, health risks, life satisfaction, use of alcohol, drugs and tobacco, strikes, voting, public policies, work accidents, prisoners and many others. In addition there have been numerous attempts in recent decades to formulate composite indices of progress to supplement or supplant GDP, including UNDPs Human Development Index (HDI), the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW), the Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI), Environmentally Sustainable National Income (eSNI), Sustainable Development Indicators (SDI), National Accounts of Well-being (NAW), Calvert-Henderson Index, and others. Before examining the utility of these alternatives, it is necessary first to examine more closely the theoretical conceptions and definitions on which they are based. All of these measures attempt to address one or more of the following aspects of progress. These terms are so commonly used today that it is natural to assume that they have standardized meanings, but this is far from the case. 8.1 Economic Growth The term economic growth is widely used with reference to increasing output by an economy as measured by total national income or expenditure, i. e. GNP or GDP. Although most criticism of GDP focuses on what are considered its wrongful inclusions and exclusions, Orio Giarini raises a more fundamental challenge regarding the basic methodology for measuring value and risk in a modern service economy, an issue already discussed in Section 7.1 above. 8.2 Economic Welfare The concept of economic welfare is employed to focus on the impact of economic growth on the material living standards of households and individual citizens, rather than on production. It includes in-kind services provided by government such as subsidized health care and educational services, while excluding defense spending and general government expenses which do not directly contribute to household consumption. 19 It also emphasizes the importance of the distribution of income and wealth in society. Economic welfare is commonly measured in terms of per capita GDP or per capita household consumption expenditure at constant currency value. International comparisons are made in purchasing power parity equivalent. We argue later in this paper that improvements in the measurement of economic welfare can and should be rapidly adopted, which will significantly enhance our understanding of the impact of economic activity on human beings. Sections 10-12 of this paper present a tentative model and supporting data for a new index of human economic welfare (HEWI). 8.3 Social Development The term development is commonly used as a catch-all phrase for something that includes, but extends beyond considerations of economic growth. Socio-economic development is frequently used as a proxy for per capita economic growth measured in real terms. Sometimes it is used with reference to the economic welfare of citizens sometimes more broadly to include non-economic factors such as health, education, life expectancy, social inclusion, gender equity, social cohesion, freedom, democratic participation and good governance and at others with reference to national investments in infrastructure, education, science and technology, energy and other fields deemed essential for national progress. In contrast to this vague general usage, we would argue for making a clear and emphatic distinction between growth and development. Growth represents a horizontal quantitative expansion of existing capacities and activities in society whereas development involves a qualitative enhancement in the structural capabilities of society, an increasing capacity for organization, coordination, and complexity. Growth may be regarded primarily as an economic concept, but development in any field belongs to the wider realm of society as a whole. Growth generates more of the same on a larger scale. Development generates something new and better that was not possible earlier. Development relates to enhancement of social productivity through strategies such as investments in human capital by education and training, enhancement of social capital and organizational capabilities with regard to governance, production, commerce, research, social welfare, etc. technological advancement, greater access to information, and networking between individuals and institutions. Indias dilemma in 1980 discussed earlier highlights the distinction. Improvements in food security, life expectancy, education, and the like represent not only real tangible benefits, but also investments in future generations that cannot be quantified in terms of present income. Although growth of per capita GDP was relatively modest, the overall improvements in quality of life and national capacity were many times greater but they were not reflected by existing measures, because none of these parameters adequately lend themselves to either precise definition or quantification. They can only be assessed on a combination of quantitative and qualitative dimensions, both tangible and intangible. But the problem of defining and measuring development lies even deeper, for it is rooted in underlying, invisible social processes that may be apparent on the surface only long afterwards. A notable instance is a phenomenon which Harlan Cleveland, former US diplomat, educator and World Academy President, observed in East Asia 60 years ago and termed the revolution of rising expectations. There he witnessed a rapid change in social attitudes expressing as higher aspirations, greater dynamism and individual initiative, sweeping aside the sense of resignation, complacency, submission to the status quo which had characterized earlier periods of relative social stagnation. He rightly perceived that this underlying wave of surging human aspirations would dramatically alter the future of East Asia in the decades to come and eventually spread its influence to other parts of the world. His insight reminds us that all economic processes occur on a bedrock social foundation and are ultimately determined by more basic social and cultural attitudes and values. The sudden explosive transformation of Eastern Europe following the fall of the Berlin Wall appears abrupt and unpredictable when viewed in terms of measurable events, but the undercurrents of revolutionary transformation were active long before they manifested on the surface in public life. The relatively recent recognition of the economic power and potential of China, India, and Brazil has a similar character. Measurement of this social process lies beyond the scope of the present study, but we note here that the future evolution of economics and other social sciences will compel us to inquire more deeply into the common principles underlying all social change and to evolve effective measures or indicators that may be very different than those currently in use to measure growth and development. 20 8.4 Sustainable Development and De-growth The Brundtland Commission popularized the term sustainable development as development that meets the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of the future generations to meet their needs. 21 While most commonly used with reference to the ecological carrying capacity of the natural environment, it is also applied with reference to economic, political, technological and social issues, including energy, water, mineral resources, climate, urban congestion, population, pollution, industrialization, technological development, public policy, health, education, and employment. The underlying concept is that both economy and society are constrained by environmental limits. Sustainable development is subject to the same vagaries as the other terms discussed above. Often, it is applied in a context that might more aptly be referred to as sustainable growth. The justification for focusing on sustainability is too obvious to require elucidation. Traditional economics made no distinction between consumption of renewable and non-renewable resources, between productive activities that enhance the environment and those that pollute or destroy it, between those that ensure the security of future generations and those that place human and other forms of life at dire risk. Although most measures of sustainability focus on ecological issues, we would argue that the term applies equally to the development of human capital, where issues such as assured access to education, vocational training, health care and employment opportunities as well as income distribution are also crucial. Views on sustainability differ with regard to future generations. Advocates of strong sustainability argue that the aim must be to ensure that individual stocks of critical natural capital, such as biological diversity, ozone layer, and carbon cycle do not decrease over time as the result of global warming, ozone layer depletion, and land degradation, i. e. each individual critical natural capital has to be maintained. Weak sustainability defines the concept more broadly to encompass economic and social as well as environmental sustainability to ensure that the overall wealth of a society, i. e. the sum of human-capital, knowledge-capital and natural-capital do not decline over time. In recent decades the concept of zero growth or de-growth has gained ground, as a stronger rejection of traditional economic growth. Degrowth challenges the necessity of current modes of consumption and advocates a return to voluntary simplicity of life style, relocalization of economic activities, and decreased energy and other resource consumption. It seeks to reverse national and global production and consumption trends to reduce the overall ecological footprint of human activity. 8.5 Quality of Life, Welfare and Well-being These three terms are sometimes used in combination or interchangeably to reflect the need for a major reorientation of public policy based on the view that economic growth is not an end in itself but a means to a greater end that encompasses social, political, cultural and even psychological needs, aspirations and values of individuals and the social collective. Actions that contribute to higher rates of economic growth and higher living standards may or may not enhance human welfare, well-being, and overall quality of life. The loss of leisure time and sense of community, breakdown of the family and social cohesion, rising incidents of divorce, crime and mental illness, deterioration of social and cultural values are common concerns. This concept emphasizes the value of non-market human activities that do not fall within the monetized economy, such as household and personal services provided by members of the family, home schooling, care for children and the elderly. This broader conception recognizes the value of intangible but vitally important elements of human life, including the sense of security, belonging, social acceptance, self-esteem, and personal fulfillment. 9. Alternative Indices The debate regarding GDP has served a meaningful purpose by helping to shape broader, more sustainable, human-centered conceptions. It has also given birth to a wide variety of alternative indices, each intended to address one or more of the deficiencies inherent in GDP. For example, Eurostat monitors 11 major categories of sustainable development indicators related to socio-economic development, sustainable consumption and production, social inclusion, demographic changes, public health, climate change and energy, sustainable transport, natural resources, global partnership and good governance, but it considers each of them separately, rather than as a composite index. 22 Apart from this there have been numerous attempts to construct composite indices for economic welfare, sustainable development, quality of life and well-being. We examine a few of the most salient in this section. 9.1 Human Development Index (HDI) UNDPs HDI is a composite statistic widely used by international organizations to evaluate and rank countries in terms of three main indicators of economic and social welfare income, health and education attainments utilizing readily available data. The income component adjusts per capita GDP as measured in constant international dollars at purchasing power parity (PPP) for inequality by discounting the income of countries that exceed the world average. Life expectancy at birth is used as an index of health. Educational attainments are measured by a weighted sum of literacy and gross enrollment rates at the primary, secondary and tertiary level, assigning two-thirds weight to the literacy subcomponent. HDI is a relatively simple composite index with a transparent structure that readily lends itself to comprehension and analysis. It is primarily suitable as a normative tool for inter-country comparisons, especially those at the lower end of the scale, rather than as an aid to policy-formation and evaluation. It consists of three main sub-indices designed to measure per capita income, education and life expectancy, each on a scale from 0 to 1.0. Scores on the three sub-indices are averaged to arrive at an overall score for HDI. 23 Since it is based on GDP data, HDI is subject to the same limitations as GDP. The use of an abstract, arbitrary rating scale (0-100) makes it very difficult for the general public to relate to HDIs scores as a measure of welfare. The substantial weightage given to literacy (22.2) seems inordinate considering that literacy is determined in many countries by the ability to read and write ones own name, while 11.1 is given to primary, secondary and tertiary school enrollment rates. HDI does not take into account income inequality or ecological factors. 9.2 Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI) GPI is a complex, composite measure consisting of 51 indicators of economic welfare, sustainable development, social welfare and well-being, including consumption income, income inequality, consumer debt, underemployment, environmental degradation, breakdown of families, crime, and the value of non-monetized household and voluntary work. It is based on the personal consumption expenditure component of GDP. It measures changes in inequality rather than absolute levels of inequality based on the Gini coefficient and Income Distribution Index. It also takes into account the costs associated with pollution, resource depletion, crime, car accidents and other defensive expenditures, including loss of leisure time. GPI assigns and incorporates a dollar value for every year of higher education, household work, parenting, volunteering. While GDP data is widely interpreted to show a near tripling of per capita income in the USA during second half of the 20th Century, GPI shows 63 rise from 1950 to 1970, then a gradual leveling followed by flat or negative growth from 1980 to 2000 as shown in Figure 1. The difference between the measures is largely the result of rising marginal costs associated with income inequality, natural capital depletion, consumer durable expenditures, defensive expenditures, undesirable side effects of growth, and net foreign borrowing since 1980 as reflected in GPI. 24 Comparison between GDP and GPI serves as an argument that policy-making and decision-making based on the use of GDP may have been appropriate during 1950-1970, but have since become inadequate and counterproductive. Figure 1: GDP per capita amp GPI per capita 1950-2004 in 2000 GPI is an admirable attempt to assess progress on a wide range of indicators related to human welfare and quality of life. Its main advantage is that, like GDP, it is a currency denominated index and bases itself on GDP consumption data. However, the necessity of combining indicators of economic, social and ecological indicators and of assigning arbitrary monetary value to a wide spectrum of immeasurable and intangible components diminishes its credibility as a real reflection of living standards. Thus far GPI calculations are available for only a handful of OECD countries and a few cities and regions within countries. The difficulty in obtaining reliable data and evolving internationally valid standards for interpretation on a very wide spectrum of economic and social variables, e. g. time spent volunteering, obesity, drug use and mental health make it unlikely that it will gain acceptance as an alternative measure of real economic performance. 9.3 Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW) ISEW is a variant of GPI and is also based on GDP personal consumption data. It makes modifications to take into account services that directly influence human welfare, e. g. public non-defensive expenditures, capital formation, domestic services, the cost of environmental degradation and depreciation of natural capital. It applies the Atkinson Index to correct for income inequality. ISEW calculations have been made for Austria, Chile, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, Australia, Belgium, Italy and USA for the period 1950 to 2000. Figure 2 compares the performance of Italy from 1990 to 2006 as measured by GDP and ISEW. 25 Figure 2: Performance of Italy 1990 to 2006 as measured by GDP amp ISEW 9.4 Weighted Index of Social Indicators (WISP) WISP is a composite index consisting of 40 economic and social indicators of development, welfare and well-being in 10 dimensions economics, welfare, demography, education, health, environment, womens status, cultural diversity, social chaos, and defense. The economic sub-index includes GDPcapita, GDP growth rate, unemployment rate, external debt and Gini index as a measure of inequality. The index has been applied to rank the progress of 16 OECD and developing countries over the period 1970 to 2000. WISP arrives at scores for each of the sub-indices, which are statistically weighted by factor analysis based on an assessment of their relative contribution to social progress. The utility of each of these and many other indices depends precisely on the intended application. GPI and ISEW require data on a wide range of factors that is only available in OECD countries. Data for HDI and WISP are available for all countries. GPI and ISEW can provide useful insights into changes over time within specific OECD countries, regions and urban areas, but are not suitable for cross-country comparisons on a global scale. GPI and ISEW both retain currency value as the unit of measure and GDP consumption related expenditure as the base. HDI and WISP utilize numerical scales unrelated to currency value. HDI is a narrow, partial measure of social development, while WISP is very broad, but lacks depth or precision in the dimensions it encompasses. This brief summary of concepts and composite indices is intended to emphasize the complexity of the challenge we face in striving to evolve more effective measures and the inherent ambiguity of the terms used to describe various conceptions. Each of the composite indices reviewed above incorporates a range of variables that span multiple dimensions of social progress economic welfare, development, sustainability, social welfare and well-being. The remainder of this article focuses on a narrower range of issues more strictly confined to measurement of economic welfare and proposes an alternative composite index somewhat narrower in scope but more proximate in its utility to GDP per capita. 10. Components of Economic Welfare Much of the criticism of GDP as a measure centers around the way it accounts or fails to account for important attributes of economic welfare. In this section we examine the most prominent of these attributes and discuss the desirability and feasibility of effectively incorporating them in a composite index suitable for both cross-country and historical comparisons. 10.1 Household Income and Consumption Expenditure GDP per capita takes into account the value of all financial transactions at market prices, including categories of expenditure such as military spending and general administration that are not directly related to household income and expenditure. Human economic welfare can be more accurately assessed by focusing on that portion of national income which relates directly to households, namely disposable income, consumption expenditure and net savings plus that portion of government expenditure related to health, education, housing, environment and social welfare. For cross-country comparisons, the most widely available and reliable data concerns household consumption expenditure (HCE) and human welfare-related government expenditure (HWGE), which includes government expenditure on education (Ed), health (He), housing and community amenities (HC), social protection (SP), environmental protection (EP), recreation, culture and religion (RCR). This omits expenditure on general public services, defense, public order and safety, and economic affairs. The sum of the above two components is divided by the total population to derive per capita human welfare consumption expenditure (HWEc), which is converted to PPP constant international dollars to facilitate cross-country and historical comparisons. 26 HWE HCE HWGE (Ed He HC SP EP RCR) --------------------- (1) When applied to a cross-section of OECD and developing countries, we find that the value of HWE ranges from a low of 41 of GDP in China to a high of 88 in Russia, but for most of the sample countries it falls between 60 and 80. HCE omits information regarding NHS, net household savings after deducting the total of all debt by households in the country, a crucial piece of information needed to assess overall human welfare and progress. Net household savings reflects the amount of financial capital available for investment by households in their future economic welfare. Combining household expenditure and household savings, we derive personal disposable income per capita (PDI): PDI HCE NHS. Table 1 compares total GDP per capita in 2005 international dollars with human welfare-related household consumption expenditure (HCEc), welfare-related government expenditure (HWGEc), net household savings (NHSc) and personal disposable income (PDI). India has the lowest GDP per capita, 45 less than Chinas, but Indias PDI is only 10 lower. This dramatic change in relative welfare results because Chinese households receive only 50 of national income as PDI whereas Indian households receive 82. This is consistent with the frequent assertion that growth of real wages is being suppressed by undervaluation of Chinas currency. 27 Chinas low HCE is offset by a high rate of capital formation (40), which is twice the USA level and nearly three times the level in Russia, reflecting a strong political commitment to investment in GDP growth. Chinas low level of household consumption expenditure and relatively high household savings rate (24) is fueled by uncertainty over provision of pensions, and the rising costs of healthcare and education. 28 Government welfare-related expenditure (HWGE) is nearly the same in both countries as a percentage of GDP and Indias net household savings rate (30) is 6 higher. These facts indicate that human economic welfare in India and China is much more similar than the wide gap that GDP figures reflects, but they do not invalidate Chinas remarkable economic gains. They only suggest that a larger proportion of those gains have thus far gone for investment in public goods than for the personal consumption and welfare. It may be justifiable as a temporary expediency, but as a long term strategy it can be used to subordinate human welfare to national economic and political power. Table 1: Values for GDP per capita (GDP) vs. household consumption expenditure per capita (HCE), welfare-related government expenditure per capita (HWGE), net household savings per capita (NHS) and personal disposable income per capita (PDI) in 2005 international dollars PPP. Values are for the year 2005. At the upper end of the income spectrum, the GDP of first ranked USA is 28 higher than second ranked UK, while its household consumption expenditure (HCE), which constitutes 70 of GDP, is 37 larger than UKs, which constitutes 66 of GDP. However, when government welfare-related expenditures (HWGE) are taken into account, the gap declines, since HWGE in the UK is 12 of GDP compared to only 6 in USA. UK savings rate was 4 compared with a zero net household savings rate in the USA throughout the first half of the decade due to a rising level of household debt. Overall, UK spends 78 of GDP on human economic welfare (HWE) compared to 76 in USA. Thus, even though PDI is 32 higher in USA, its actual HWE is only 25 higher than UK. As we shall see, the gap in welfare between these countries shrinks even further when other aspects of human welfare are taken into account. In contrast, the GDP of third ranked Germany is 33 lower than USA, while its HWE is 43 less, in spite of the fact that HWGE in Germany (14) is more than twice the USA level. This is explained by the fact that Germans receive a 13 lower share in national income but save a very high portion of what they receive (16). Among OECD countries, PDI ranges from a low of 50 of GDP in Sweden to a high of 76 in Mexico and Turkey. As expected, Sweden has the highest rate of HWGE at 16 as well as the highest proportion of overall government expenditure, 50 higher than in the USA, offset by smaller share of household consumption in GDP. 29 Russias high HCE, HWGE and PDI as a percentage of GDP result from 10 percent growth rate in incomes, a doubling of real incomes and halving of the poverty rate since 2000, a 10 decline in the proportion of income spends on food from 1993-2003, an 18 compounded increase in consumer spending since 2004 reflective of a growing middle class, combined with a low flat rate 13 income tax, subsidized for housing and utilities equivalent of 20 of household income, a 13 savings rate, rising oil prices during that period and rising levels of direct foreign investment. 30. 31 A recent study attributes the very high level of household consumption as a percentage of income to large-scale under-reporting of income data by households. 32 This analysis is intended to bring out the variety of factors that determine the relationship between GDP and human economic welfare and the fallacy of trying to deduce welfare based solely on per capita GDP. These differences point to the need for economic theory and measurement to openly adopt a position on the purpose of economic growth and development. Like any human activity that loses sight of its central purpose and place in the wider scheme of social existence, economic growth for its own sake is subject to diminishing returns and potentially disastrous consequences. Here we are not dealing with impersonal values that are the creation of physical nature, but rather personal values which are wholly the creation of human beings and need to reflect universal human aspirations. We have both the capacity and a responsibility to redefine our concepts to reflect human values. After suffering from scarcity for millennium, it was natural of people to assume that more is always good. Today we are faced with the fallacy in the facile assumption. Everywhere we confront the consequences of unconscious and unconscionable excess that depletes the abundant riches of our natural environment, while concentrating destabilizing accumulations of wealth among the few, an essential cause for the Great Crashes of 1929 and 2008. 10.2 Income Inequality One of the serious criticisms of GDP is its blatant disregard of income distribution. In recent decades income inequality has risen in many cases sharply in most countries in the world. From the 1960s to the 1990s, inequality declined in only 9 out of 73 countries for which data is available. 33 The significance of disregarding the impact of income distribution on economic welfare can be illustrated with reference to the USA, where income inequalities are at their highest levels since 1929. 34 In 1979, the richest 1 of American families took in about 9 of the nations total income by 2007, the top 1 took in 23.5 of total income. During this period, the after-tax income of this group rose by 281, whereas the growth of the middle fifth of households averaged only 25 and the bottom fifth only 16 as shown in Figure 3. 35 At the very least this figure shows the illusory effect of regarding growth of GDP as synonymous with increasing general welfare. In simple terms, this means that the good news about economic progress over the past three decades applied almost exclusively to a small portion of the entire population. Krugman estimates that perhaps as much as 70 of all of the income growth in the United States during the 1980s went to the richest 1 of all families. 36 Figure 3: Percent Change in After-Tax Income since 1979 in USA Thus, it is evident that income distribution is an important determinant of the impact of economic growth on economic welfare. As Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi observe in the report of the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress, When there are large changes in inequality (more generally a change in income distribution), gross domestic product (GDP) or any other aggregate computed per capita may not provide an accurate assessment of the situation in which most people find themselves. If inequality increases enough relative to the increase in average per capita GDP, most people can be worse off even though average income is increasing. 37 10.2.1 Impact of Inequality on Economic Welfare High levels of inequality are associated with a wide range of social ills. Studies in the USA show that states with greater inequality in the distribution of income also had higher rates of unemployment, higher rates of incarceration, a higher percentage of people receiving income assistance and food stamps, and a greater percentage of people without medical insurance. The gap between rich and poor was the best predictor of these problems, not the average income in the state. In addition, states with greater inequality of income distribution also spent less per person on education and had lower school completion rates, poorer educational performance, a greater proportion of babies born with low birth weight, higher rates of homicide, higher rates of violent crime, a greater proportion of disabled workers, and a higher proportion of the population being inactive. 38. 39 While income inequality is considerably lower in countries such as Germany and Japan than it is in USA, it is even higher in Argentina, Brazil, Malaysia, Mexico, and South Africa and only marginally lower in China and Russia. Indeed, the same distorting impact of income inequality on the validity of per capita GDP is universal. Internationally, high levels of inequality are also associated with lower levels of economic growth, decreasing life expectancy, poorer educational performance, increasing crime rates, higher levels of corruption, and increased macro-economic instability, as well as low levels of development of human capital. 40 Wilkinson and Pickett found that the incidence of health and social problems is higher in countries with higher levels of inequality. 41 Countries at the same level of per capita income vary widely in health and social problems due to differences in income distribution. Income inequality is a more accurate predictor of problems than actual level of income. 42 More equitable distribution is linked to higher levels of economic growth. IMF research confirms the growing recognition that an excessively unequal income distribution may itself be detrimental to sustainable growth. 43 High inequality reduces economic development by slowing poverty eradication, retarding investments in education, and inhibiting entrepreneurship. 44 World Bank and others have drawn attention to health as a factor in economic development. 45 Health is an important determinant of the productivity of human capital. Fogel found that one third or more of the economic growth in England over the past two centuries was attributable to improvements in nutrition. 46 As we have shown above, inequality has detrimental effect on health and life expectancy, thereby decreasing economic growth. Bloom and Canning found that an extra year of life expectancy is associated with a 4 rise in per capita GDP in the long run. 47 They argue that healthy individuals are more efficient at assimilating knowledge and, in consequence, attain higher productivity levels. 48 Employment and income distribution are also closely related. While employment rates and incomes levels tend to be high for educated and skilled workers, unemployment and underemployment are much higher for those with lower levels of educational attainment, especially among youth, the poor and the unskilled in many countries. High levels of inequality are also associated with economic instability. Rising levels of income inequality result in the increasing concentration of wealth, a major source of international currency flows and speculative investments and a contributor to traumatic economic events. Since the rich spend a much smaller proportion of their incomes than other income groups, a rise in income at the top creates fewer jobs and slower growth. In addition much of their earnings are invested in commodities, stocks and real estate, a stimulus to price bubbles. 49 The period 1910-1929 leading up to the Great Crash in the USA was characterized by a near doubling of the share of income going to the top 1 of the income distribution. In the 1920s, 5 of Americans earned a third of the total national income and the top 1 owned an all-time-high 36 of the nations assets. 50 The same phenomenon repeated during the period 1989-2008 immediately preceding the current international financial crisis. Meanwhile, household debt in the USA as a share of GDP increased by 50. While in 1987 the bottom half of American households debt was roughly equivalent to its net wealth, in 2008 its debt was twice the value of its net wealth. 51 Over the past decade, a similar imbalance has occurred internationally, leading to what has been aptly termed a global savings glut. It has been accompanied by weak investment and sluggish consumption. 52 From 1980 to 2006, total international financial flows rose from 12 trillion to 167 trillion, a fourteen-fold increase in 26 years, equivalent to almost three times total world GDP. Since 2004, currency trading has soared 69 to over 4 trillion per day. 53 In 2000, the financial assets held by the wealthiest 7.2 million individuals in the world, representing 0.1 of the worlds population, were valued at US27 trillion, equivalent to almost half of the entire worlds GDP (61 trillion). The assets of the top 200 richest people amount to more than the combined income of 41 of the worlds population. 54 Of course, not all concentration of wealth is detrimental to social progress. It is also the source of huge philanthropic endowments in support of health, education, research and cultural activities by well-known foundations such as Carnegie, Rockefeller, Gates and many others. Charitable donations in the USA were over 300 billion in 2009, equivalent to 2.2 of GDP or about 10 of the total PDI of the top 20 of US households. 55 Although 89 of American households give to charity, a large portion of this comes from the top income group. The impact of income inequality on economic growth and human welfare consumption expenditure is complex and difficult to isolate from innumerable other factors. But the notion that high levels of inequality are necessary for high rates of economic growth is clearly not valid. During the period 1950 to 1973, a period of falling inequality within most countries, the world experienced the fastest rates of economic growth in recorded history, with the exception of subsequent achievements by the Asian Tigers. In contrast, the post-1973 has seen much slower rates of economic growth amid rising levels of income inequality. 56 It is equally evident that high levels of inequality can curtail human economic welfare, as when rural land assets are concentrated in the hands of a landlord class employing landless laborers at subsistence wages. High income inequality can also retard investments in human capital, which are essential for rising living standards. The importance of measuring income inequality is heightened in an age of globalization. Even while inter-country inequalities have declined in some cases, studies by Cornia and Kiiski and others have found increased intra-country inequalities. 57 While the progress of China over the past 35 years is largely responsible for the reduction in cross-country inequality, intra-country income inequality within China as measured by the Gini coefficient rose 30 from 1980 to 2005. 58 Intra-country inequality is also increasing among the wealthiest countries. As UNDP has pointed out, in 1960 the top 20 of the worlds people in the richest countries had 30 times the income (in terms of total GDP) of the poorest 20. This grew to 32 times in 1970, 45 times in 1980, and 59 times in 1989. By 1997, the top 20 received 74 times the income of the bottom 20. While economic growth in the 19th century was largely driven by increasing capital investment in industry, we now live in a world of excess production capacity where growth depends primarily on increasing levels of consumption expenditure, which means that the greatest benefit will accrue from raising the incomes of the 2.8 billion people living on less than 2 per day, who have the highest marginal propensity to consume. 59 10.2.2 Theories of Income Inequality Rising levels of inequality result from multiple causes, including a rising share of capital in total income as well as increases in earnings inequality, rural-urban and regional differences, technology change, trade and financial liberalization, privatization, taxation policies and change in labour market institutions. 60 It is evident that new economic theory is needed to explicate the relationships between these factors and that new empirical research is needed to measure its expressions in different countries and under different circumstances. Barro cites four broad categories of economic theory that have been constructed to assess the macroeconomic relations between inequality and economic growth. These theories can be classed according to the main feature stressed: credit-market imperfections, political economy, social unrest, and saving rates. As he observes, each of these theories has offsetting effects that lead to ambiguous conclusions. Based on his empirical research, Barro concluded that income-equalizing policies might be justified on growth promotion grounds in poor countries, but not necessarily in more prosperous countries. 61 A true perspective on the role of inequality can only emerge when this issue is viewed from the wider perspective of social development theory. Differences in levels of accomplishment can ignite aspirations and act as a powerful spur to growth and development, provided the distance and obstacles are not so great as to discourage effort and generate alienation. Much more theoretical and empirical work is needed regarding the impact of economic inequality on overall levels of economic welfare, sustainable social development, human welfare and well-being. Both theoretical and practical efforts to assess the real impact of economic activity on human welfare at the household level necessitate the inclusion of some measure of income distribution. 10.2.3 Measuring Income Inequality Many economists have long been arguing for inclusion of income distribution in measures of human welfare. The Gini coefficient is the most frequently-used index for assessing differences in inequality between countries and over time. But Gini is a stand-alone figure that is not based on any distributional model. Nor does it tell us where within a population the inequality occurs or the impact of that inequality on human economic welfare of the society. Based solely on net household income, Gini does not accurately reflect differences in wealth. Some countries with a relatively low coefficient of inequality for income have a much higher coefficient for inequality of wealth. Nor does it reflect differences in inequality of opportunity arising from social barriers to upward mobility. In addition, Gini does not take into account non-monetized goods and services, such as the consumption of home-grown food, which is very high among the rural poor in many countries, e. g. estimated at 25 in Russia. Other measures of inequality are subject to similar constraints. The quintile or weighted average method, Atkinson method and max-min method apply alternative approaches which explicitly introduce distributional objectives into measures of inequality. Jorgenson showed how information about consumption expenditure and aversion towards inequality can be combined to yield a measure of living standards. 62 Other measures of inequality include the Hoover Index and Theil Index, each with its own utility and limitations. Hoover measures the proportion of all income which would have to be redistributed to achieve a state of perfect equality on a scale of 0 (perfect equality) to 1 (maximum inequality). Theil is a measure of distributional entropy on a scale of 0 to 1. It takes an 18:82 ratio of income distribution as equal to 0 and a state of maximum entropy in which income earners cannot be distinguished by their resources as equal to 1. Theil has the added characteristic of being decomposable to distinguish between inequality in different sub-regions. 63 The Atkinson Index has the ability to gauge movements in different segments of the income distribution. It can be converted into a normative measure by imposing a coefficient to weight incomes. UNDP and Eurostat monitor inequality by the ratio of total disposable income received by the 20 of the population with the highest income (top quintile) to that received by the 20 of the population with the lowest income (lowest quintile). Gini measures differences in income between a state in which all households in the population have the same income and the Lorenz curve which measures the actual distribution. Country scores on the Gini index range from a low of 23 in Sweden to a high of 60 or more in several African nations. The quintile dispersion method shows that the ratio of the lowest to highest income groups ranges from 3.4 in Japan, 4.3 in Germany, and 4.9 in India, to 8.4 in USA, 10.7 in China, 23.7 in Brazil and 57.6 times in Sierra Leone. 64 Most of these indices are based on complex statistical calculations and summarize inequality in the entire income range. Each provides some insight into the extent and distribution of inequality, but they are not strictly comparable because they have different levels of sensitivity to incomes in different parts of the distribution. 65 For example, Theil and Hoover give contrasting results depending on whether the income distribution is characterized by high or low levels of inequality. Atkinsons sensitivity varies according to the level of inequality and weight assigned to the normative coefficient. Ryscavage applied four of these indices to measure income inequality in the USA from 1967 to 2006 and found significant variations both in the extent of inequality recorded as well as the rate of change over time. 66 One limitation of these methods is that they generate a separate score for income inequality but do not correlate it with actual income level. To overcome this limitation, in 1976 Amartya Sen proposed the Social Welfare Function (SWF), which multiplies mean per capita GDP by one minus Gini to arrive at an adjusted per capita income. SWF GDPc (1-G). An advantage of this approach is that it is a real-valued function which enables monitoring of changes in per capita income in a manner that more closely approximates the actual impact on the majority of households. SWF is a measure of both equality and efficiency. It reflects both overall economic performance as well as income distribution. It can rise as a result either of higher economic performance or more equitable distribution. Mukhopadhaya has proposed an alternative SWF to eliminate its inherent bias toward higher income groups. 67 10.2.4 Maximizing Growth amp Equality Like other measures of inequality, Sens SWF is primarily intended to measure income distribution, not overall economic welfare. There is no justification for concluding that such a perfect state of equality as measured by Gini would lead to the optimal level of economic welfare for the population as a whole. Rather it may lead to a state in which on average everyone is equally less well off. For these reasons, SWF cannot be regarded as an effective measure of human welfare, even if it is found to be an accurate index of income inequality. Moreover, different measures of inequality result in different SWF functions. To illustrate, we compared SWFG based on Gini with SWFT, a similar function using the Theil Index for several countries based on data for the year 2000. For Brazil, SWFT was more than twice as large as SWFG. For UK, it was 46 larger. Promoting greater political, economic and social equality are valid goals in their own right. But our objective here is more limited. It is to measure overall economic welfare, rather than income inequality or social equity. Income inequality, like social status and other forms of social differential, plays both a positive and a negative role in development, as a stimulus to social aspirations and as an impediment to the full and effective utilization of national wealth for human welfare. As Raghuram Rajan, former IMF Chief Economist, observes in his recent book Fault Lines, Not all forms of income inequality are economically harmful. Higher wages serve to reward the very talented and hardworking, identify the jobs in the economy that need the most skills, and signal to the young the benefits of investing in their own human capital. A forced equalization of wages that disregards the marginal contribution of different workers will deaden incentives and lead to a misallocation of resources and effort. 68 Although we know that not all income inequality can be considered detrimental to economic welfare, the precise relationship between equality and efficiency is complex and unknown. We cannot assume that a completely equal distribution of income would lead to optimum social benefits, since beyond a certain level greater equality may discourage innovation, initiative and incentives for higher performance. Indeed, differences in level of attainment act as an essential stimulus to economic progress, as they do to progress in all fields of human activity. We may find, for instance, that the reductions in the income differences between the top and bottom income groups of a population result in higher levels of consumption and employment generation, whereas reduction of inequalities within each subset of total population reduce the motivation for higher performance. Thus, we need to take into account both the negative and positive effects on inequality on human economic welfare. Cornia and Court address the complex relationship between inequality and growth. They define an efficient inequality range as an inequality range that is most efficient for economic growth as depicted in Figure 4. They postulate that this range probably lies somewhere between a Gini value of 0.25 typical of Northern European countries and value of 0.40 in USA and Russia. Any country that intends to maximize poverty reduction should choose the lowest level of inequality (I1) within the efficient inequality range (I1-I2). Aiming for the lower end of range is important because one obtains the same level of growth at lower levels of inequality, but it allows the reduction of poverty at a faster rate. 69 Figure 4: Inequality amp Growth 10.2.5 Economic Welfare Index Note that both Sens SWF as well as Cornia and Courts efficient inequality range focus on economic growth rather than economic welfare of individuals and households, which is the focus of this paper. For this reason, we support efforts to define a variant of the efficient inequality range which is most conducive for human economic welfare, rather than growth per se. We recognize that this range may vary widely between different countries and conditions. Although the exact composition of the range is not known, we can readily conceive of a hypothetical balance between income distribution and incentives for income generation which might achieve the goal of optimizing human economic welfare for the society as a whole. Therefore, we need to adjust SWF for efficiency. We introduce a coefficient of efficiency e. The value of e ranges between 0 and 1. The lower the value of e, the higher the level of inequality required for optimal economic welfare. In addition, it is evident that countries which have already achieved low levels of inequality will have lower values of e than countries presently operating at high levels of inequality. Our approach differs from Sens SWF and others in one other important respect. The indices of inequality discussed above are typically applied to measure income inequality and take GDP as the base. Our objective here is to measure the impact of inequality on levels of welfare-related household consumption expenditure rather than income. Consumption inequality is typically lower than income inequality, because high income households consume a much lower percentage of their total income than low income households. For this reason, we cannot apply income inequality metrics to household consumption in their present form. We need to also adjust SWF by a coefficient c representing the difference between income inequality and consumption inequality in the population. In this paper we propose a new index, the Economic Welfare Index (EWI), which is a modification of Sens SWF designed to reflect that portion of inequality which negatively impacts on economic welfare as measured by household consumption expenditure. EWI is derived by converting Gini into Gec according to formula 2 below. 70 G ec represents that proportion of the Gini coefficient which is compatible with optimal levels of economic welfare as measured by household consumption expenditure. Note that Gec increases as Gini rises, reflecting the fact that high Gini countries have a greater potential for reducing inequality without dampening economic incentives that promote human welfare. G ec is intended to measure income inequality against a standard of optimal welfare inequality, which can be defined as that the lowest level of inequality compatible with the highest level of overall human economic welfare for the society as a whole. EWI is personal disposable income (PDI) multiplied by Gec plus government welfare-related expenditure on households (HWGE). Note that HWGE is not adjusted by Gec since the distribution of government services is far more equitable than the distribution of income and consumption expenditure and is skewed in favor of lower income families. EWI PDI (1 - G ec ) HWGE EWI PDI (1.1 - 0.65G) HWGE This equation adjusts PDI to take into account the impact of inequality on optimal economic welfare. Further research is needed to more precisely determine the value of Gec under different circumstances. Table 2 shows that when adjusted for inequality (G ec ) per capita disposable income (col G - col D) declines by a minimum of 3 in Sweden and 5 in Korea to a maximum of 17 in Brazil and 23 in South Africa. The difference is reduced when we factor in the government human welfare-related expenditure, which is more equitably distributed among the population. In this case five countries actually register a rise in economic welfare as a percentage of GDP by (col I - col D) 3 in Italy and UK, 5 in Japan and Spain, 7 in Germany and 14 in Sweden. This illustrates the problem of viewing per capita GDP or even PDI without factoring in both inequality and welfare-related payments by government. When measured by EWI, the USA still remains the most prosperous nation followed by Germany. Surprisingly we find that while Chinas per capita GDP is 66 higher than Indias, its EWI is only 5 more. This results from the fact that Indias personal disposable income represents 82 of GDP whereas Chinas is only 51. At the upper end, USAs GDP is 28 higher than second ranked UK, but its EWI is only 17 higher than UK and 16 higher than second ranked Germany. Table 2: Values for GDP per capita (GDP), personal disposable income per capita (PDI) and Economic Welfare Index per capita (EWI) in 2005 international dollars PPP, Gini, Gini adjusted constant (G ec ). All values are for the year 2005 10.3 Employment In a market economy where employment is the principal means by which people acquire access to the income needed for goods, services and economic security, unemployment is the severest form of deprivation, akin to political disenfranchisement in a democracy. Policy-makers certainly recognize the potential political power of the unemployed, provided this disparate group could ever get organized. Government officials recognize the linkage between rising levels of unemployment and other social ills such as crime, violence, drug use and social unrest. Wray observes that the direct social costs of unemployment in the USA are equal or greater in value to the financial cost of guaranteeing them employment. 71 Unemployment and underemployment also represent severe forms of wastefulness, waste of human resources. Like other perishable goods, unutilized human capacities tend to degenerate over time, both from want of usage and because of the increasing social alienation and loss of self-esteem associated with unemployment. The remarkable decision of the Government of India to guarantee a minimum of 100 days per year of employment to the 45 million poorest households is testament to the growing recognition of the essential role of employment in human welfare. Yet in spite of these facts, the plight of the unemployed is largely ignored by traditional income measures of human welfare and by many broader indices of social progress. Eurostat includes six individual measures of employment and unemployment in the list of Sustainable Development Indicators which it monitors. But of the composite indices discussed in Section 6, only WISP incorporates a direct measure of unemployment. The Calvert-Henderson Quality of Life indicators include 10 different measures of employment and unemployment, but it relies on data that is available in the USA and only a few other countries. One obvious reason for the omission of unemployment in aggregate measures of human welfare is the difficulty that arises in assigning a market value to unemployment. Reliable measures of unemployment are themselves difficult to obtain. Even in OECD countries, the official figures mask the fact that large numbers of people have dropped out of the job market in discouragement and resignation. When underemployment is taken into account, actual levels may be considerably higher than official figures. 72 A study in Australia in 2003 found that 25 of part-time workers sought an average of 37.5 longer working hours. 73 These studies cannot detect what ILO terms invisible underemployment, which refers to situations where workers were not fully using their skills in their current employment (because the job itself is low-skill andor the worker is idle part of the time). In most developing countries where the informal sector predominates, official figures are even less reliable. In India, for example, the informal sector accounts for about 90 of total employment. Government is simply unable to monitor what is happening to huge numbers of new entrants to the workforce, although rising wage levels and increasing shortages of labor suggest that job growth equals or may even exceed growth of the labour force. To illustrate the magnitude of the problem, while ILO figures report an average unemployment rate in India of 2 during the period 2000, an Indian government expert task force concluded the actual figure was 7.3. 74 For the purposes of this study, ILO data has been used for all countries. It may be argued that the impact of unemployment on human welfare is already reflected in per capita GDP and measures of inequality, making inclusion of a separate index redundant. However, a recent ILO study confirms that this is not the case. No clear link emerges between overall changes in employment and inequality. Some countries have created many jobs and at the same time income inequality increased significantly. Other good employment performers saw stable or even declining income inequality. to some extent, this reflects the diverse nature of the jobs created. 75 Over the past two decades, relatively robust growth in employment has been accompanied by rising levels of inequality. The ILO report attributes this finding to changes in the structure of employment, including an increase in part-time, temporary and informal employment. Furthermore, in recent years there is a growing prevalence of jobless growth, a condition in which GDP rises but unemployment remains high. For these reasons, we argue that separate indices of employment and unemployment need to be incorporated in a composite index of economic welfare. The task of accounting for the economic impact of unemployment is complicated by the fact that there are different types of unemployment and not all types have equal impact on economic welfare. Workers aged 15 to 24 represent about a quarter of the worlds labour force, ranging from 8 to 16 in Europe and North America to 18 in China, 23 in India and 28 to 30 in most parts of Africa. Youth employment is of crucial importance since it reflects on the capacity of the society to generate sufficient job opportunities for the next generation and to prepare them adequately to avail of the opportunities. In marked contrast to previous recessions, rising levels of long term unemployment is a striking characteristic of the current economic downturn in the USA and other OECD countries. In the USA, 46 of the unemployed have been out of work for more than six months and their jobs are unlikely to come back. 76 Measures of long term unemployment, as well as the average length of unemployment in that group, provide valuable information regarding economic welfare and security. The problem of long term unemployment is compounded by high levels of unemployment among those 55 years of age or older, as a result of age discrimination when jobs are scarce, increasing obsolescence of skills as a by-product of rapid technological advancement, and the economic dislocation experienced by transition economies. Today 2.2 million American workers over 55 are unemployed, half of them long term, and the poverty rate among this group has risen significantly. 77 Increasing life expectancy magnifies the problem of those above 65 years of age who are compelled to retire but do not have adequate savings or pensions to ensure economic security during an extended period of retirement, as well among those who are still healthy and eager for gainful employment. In addition to differences in levels of unemployment, countries also vary enormously in the overall employment-to-working-age-population-ratio (EPR). EPR is an important index of the utilization of human resources. From 1970 to 1990 the employment-to-population ratio (EPR) for those 65 years and above fell dramatically in OECD countries but it has since begun to rise again in many countries, with the exception of Europe. In an effort to raise 20 million people out of poverty, the European Union has committed to raising EPR for the age group 20-64 by 6 by 2020. Low EPR in OECD countries usually reflects a low level of participation by women in the workforce as the result of cultural tradition and gender discrimination. Low EPR for 15-64 age group can also results from high levels of tertiary education. EPR for many developing countries is higher than OECD rates, usually because of the large percentage of the workforce engaged in agricultural operations. Therefore measures of EPR for the age group 25 may be considered more reliable. ILO is the only source of EPR data for all countries and they use an open ended measure for population aged 15 and 25. One advantage is that it does not place an arbitrary limit on retirement age. Data for both employment and unemployment rates for most developing countries are based on rough estimates or sample surveys, which are inherently unreliable. Note that these problems are not confined to developing countries. They are universal. This month the Government of Japan reported that more than 230,000 Japanese centenarians listed on government records cannot be located. Many are believed to be dead, some for decades. 78 Significant changes over time in the reported employment and unemployment rates may be a more reliable index than the absolute numbers. An adequate index of employment should also reflect the capacity of the economy to create new jobs. Net employment generation tells us whether the economy is creating more job opportunities and whether or not their number is sufficient to compensate for the increasing number of new entrants to the workforce. Two countries with the same unemployment rates may differ significantly in their capacity for job creation. For example, Argentina and Germany both reported unemployment rates of 11 in 2005, but the total number of new jobs in Argentina grew by 4.3 over the previous year compared with only 0.3 in Germany. The present economic theory accords greater importance to production and efficiency than it does to the value of human beings and ignore employment. Is this value system essential or inevitable Granted that there are real obstacles to effective measurement, efforts to take into account this crucial aspect of economic welfare are essential for the development of more reliable measures. Unemployment is both an economic and a social problem. Gender or racial discrimination in employment, rising rates of crime and violence, loss of self-esteem and alienation arising from absence of social status and identity are important social aspects of the issue. Obviously, there is a need to develop a new economic theory Here we attempt to develop an index that focuses more narrowly on the impact of employment on the economic welfare of the population. 10.3.1 Full Employment Index The interaction between employment, education, disposable income, government welfare-related expenditure and income inequality is complex and multi-directional. We know that rising levels of unemployment reduce disposable income, increase inequality and stimulate transfer payments to some extent. More difficult to measure is the impact of under-employment, which may be many times higher than the actual unemployment rate, and part-time work, which can be the result of either personal preference or lack of opportunities. Changes in demography, social attitudes and living standards also powerfully influence long term employment trends. An index that partially reflects the impact of unemployment on economic welfare can provide useful insights and guidance to policy-makers when viewed as a complement to monitoring of incomes, inequality and education. Taking into account the paucity of reliable data on some dimensions of the issue, we propose a composite index for Full Employment (FEI) which includes four sub-indices. Employment-Population Index EPI is arrived at by taking the Employment-Population ratio for those aged 25 and converting it into a scale from 0.01 to 1.0, assuming that 66 EPR represents full employment. 79 Note the cutoff level for full employment rises to 80, if EPR is considered for aged 25-64 only. Adult Employment Index AEI measures the rate of employment among members of the labour force aged 25. The adult unemployment rate is derived by deducting from total employment and unemployment data, those under 25 years of age. 80 Adult underemployment is estimated by taking twice the level of adult unemployment. Our justification for doubling the unemployment rate is to take into account hidden underemployment and unemployment of discouraged workers who have dropped out of the labour market. Thus, AEI 1- 2(AUR). Youth Employment Index YEI measures the rate of employment among members of the labour force aged 15-24. It is derived by taking 1 minus the youth unemployment rate (YUR). In recognition of the great importance of providing employment opportunities to the young generation, we have assigned a weight to YEI equal to that of AEI, even in cases where the actual proportion of youth in the work force is far less than 50. YEI 1 - YUR. Job Creation Index JCI measures the net rate of change in total employment year-to-year. JCR measures the net change in the total number of jobs from year to year, which serves as the basis for the index JCI. JCI (1 JCR) JCI 1 (( TE2-TE1)TE1), where TE1 amp TE2 are total employment in the previous and subsequent year. A value less than one for JCI signifies a decline in total employment from the previous year. A value of more than one signifies an increase in employment. Thus, a grow rate of employment of 10 would be indicated by a value of 1.10. Full Employment Index FEI is equal to the average of the four sub-indices as shown below. FEI (EPI AEI YEI JCI)4 Table 3 presents several key indices of employment which are periodically monitored by almost all countries. The table is divided into two halves. The left side contains data for total unemployment rate (TUR), youth unemployment rate (YUR), employment to population ratio age 25 (EPR), and net job creation rate (JCR) given as percentages. The right side contains the derived indices for youth employment (YEI), adult employment (AEI), employment to population (EPI), job creation (JCI) and the composite Full Employment Index (FEI), which is the average of the four sub-indices. Note that a high FEI does not mean there is no further scope for improving the quality or number of employment opportunities. It only signifies that unemployment as measured by these parameters has relatively low impact on consumption expenditure and income inequality. 81 Country FEI scores range from a high of 96 in Mexico, India and China to a low of 69 in South Africa. We realize that data for these calculations from developing countries is notably unreliable, but OECD countries are not exempt from reliability problems. To some extent the tendency to underestimate the magnitude of unemployment is offset by the fact that higher unemployment will also express as lower levels of PDI and higher levels of inequality, both of which result in lower overall rankings on the composite index, which includes EWI and employment. Between 2005 and 2009, the FEI for USA fell from 94 to 91, as a result of a doubling of total unemployment in the country. This figure underestimates the total impact of the current economic downturn, but here too the impact would also be reflected in a lower EWI. The very low FEI of 69 for South Africa results from a high total unemployment rate of 27 combined with an even higher unemployment rate of 54 among youth, who constitute 33 of the labour force. Table 3: Employment sub-indices and FEI for selected countries for the year 2005 Figure 5: Youth Employment Index 1985-2005 Figure 5 shows 20 year trends in youth unemployment for select countries as measured by YEI (1.00 full employment). We find the sharpest drop in YEI for Sweden from 0.93 to 0.77. The oscillation in YEI for Sweden and Spain require further analysis. YEI is relatively constant over time in Korea and India, in spite of a huge surge in the under 25 population, and rising most dramatically in Spain from 0.56 to 0.80 and Italy from 0.66 to 0.76 Table 4 shows historical trends on FEI from 1985 to 2005 for select countries. This table will be referred to for the historical analysis of HEWI in Section 10 of this paper. Table 4: Historical trends on FEI from 1985 to 2005 for select countries 10.4 Education Education is rightly regarded as an essential component of overall human development and well-being. Our objective here is confined to measurement of human economic welfare, rather than human development per se. Here too, education needs to be included, since the relationship between education and incomes is well documented. Cross country studies indicate that an extra year of school is associated with a 30 increase in per capita income as shown in Figure 6. 82 Throughout the world, higher levels of education are also associated with higher levels of employment and higher income. An extra year of schooling increases earnings from 6 to 14. 83 Other studies reveal a very high correlation between education and per capita GDP in both developed and developing countries, as measured by UNDPs composite education index. 84 Figure 6: Years of Schooling amp Country GDP Rising levels of education are also associated with lower levels of unemployment. In the USA those with a high school diploma earn 42 more and had an unemployment rate 36 lower than those without a high school diploma. 85 In the Czech Republic, unemployment among university graduates is only 2 compared with 23 for those who did not finish secondary school. 86 University graduates in Norway and Hungary earn 26 and 117 more respectively than those who only finish secondary school. 87 All of the individual and composite measures referred to above incorporate indices for education, though the rationale and approach varies. HDI allocates one-third of its total weightage to measures of literacy and school enrollment, in the proportion literacy (23) and primary-secondary-tertiary school enrollment (13). The heavy weightage assigned to basic literacy in HDI appears disproportionate, especially considering the way literacy is defined and measured in many developing countries. GPI assigns a dollar value to each year of higher education. ISEW includes 50 of all public and private expenditure on higher education in its calculation of total consumption expenditure. While this may be suitable for an index applied solely to OECD countries, for global application and cross-country comparisons, the exclusive focus on higher education seems somewhat arbitrary, since many developing countries have yet to achieve universal enrollment at lower levels. 88 While educational enrollment rates have risen dramatically over the past five decades, there is still a significant proportion of the worlds population that lacks this most fundamental asset for improving their economic welfare. Still more than 100 countries have not yet achieved 90 net enrollment rates for primary education and of these 44 are still below 80. In Sub-Saharan Africa the average is under 70. Only 12 countries in the world have achieved net secondary education enrollment rates of 90 or higher. Tertiary enrollment among those in the five year age group beyond secondary school ranges from less than 1 to a high of 92 in Korea. Only 24 countries have rates of 50 or higher, 86 countries have rates of less than 25, and 53, rates of less than 10. 89 Enrollment rates are at best a very crude measure of educational attainment, often concealing as much as they reveal of true progress toward universal education. Recent surveys report that the average reading ability of Indonesian school students is equivalent to that of the lowest 7 of French students, the average math ability of Brazilian school students is equal to the abilities of the bottom 2 of Danish students, 31 of Indian students who completed the lower primary cycle could not read a simple story and 29 could not do two-digit math problems. In Ghana, only 25 of 15-19 year olds score more than 50 on a test of one and two digit math questions. Despite the countrys top rank in terms of total spending on education, U. S. students scored lower on science literacy than their peers in 16 of the other 29 OECD jurisdictions and 6 of the 27 non - OECD jurisdictions. 90 While any attempt to assign economic value to education must be subjective, abstract numerical scales such as HDI and cost-based measures such as GPI fail to take into account the direct contribution of education to economic performance and living standards. In constructing an index of economic welfare, we focus instead on the role of education as an investment in future economic performance. Rather than trying to assign arbitrary value to each year of education, we consider current economic performance as a result and reflection of the past educational attainments of the workforce. A rise in the average levels of education today represents an investment that will reflect in higher economic performance in the future. Since the essential purpose of an indicator is to promote effective policy-making and action, an indicator that factors in rising levels of investment in education assigns value to actions today that will contribute to future economic welfare. 10.4.1 Combined Education Index The Combined Education Index (CEI) assesses the changes in school enrollment rates for primary, secondary and higher education over time as a measure of changes in the future capacity of society to generate human welfare. Regarding economic performance as a function of education, we adjust current level of economic welfare by an index that reflects the change in the enrollment rate at primary, secondary and tertiary levels over a period of time. Data on enrollment levels is notably unreliable in many countries compounded by over and under age students and home schooling. Even countries with advanced statistical systems such as USA are subject to major inaccuracies in the data. 91 Calculations are based on the gross enrollment rates for primary (PER), secondary (SER) and tertiary (TER) as normalized by UNDP for the combined enrollment rates (CGER) used in the Human Development Index. 92. 93 In consideration of the increasing importance of higher education in economic development and welfare, the index assigns double weightage to changes in tertiary rates. We designate this modified CGER as CER H . 94 CER H 0.33 PER 0.23 SER 0.44 TER In recognition of the time lag between acquisition of education and its impact on economic activity, we define the Combined Education Index (CEI) through CER n . CER n measures the absolute change in combined enrollment levels over time (equation 6a). CEI measures the cumulative impact of that change on human economic welfare at any point during 25 years in time subsequent to the change in CER H . As the more educated youth enter the workforce and the impact of rising levels of education gradually impacts on actual GDP and HWE, the factor multiplying CER n . i. e. 1, 0.9, 0.81 etc. for past educational achievements declines proportionately, because over time the impact of earlier education enrollment comes to be reflected in GDP and in our HWE. As an example, CEI (2005) for Sweden for year 2005 is given by: Table 5: CEI of selected countries 2005 Table 5 shows the CEI of selected countries for 2005. Korea achieved a CEI of 1.16 as a result of a 67 rise in CER from 1975-1995, including a 478 rise in tertiary enrollment from 9 in 1975 to 52 in 1995. Its CER rose by 28 from 1995 to 2005. Sweden also recorded a CEI 2005 of 1.16 as a result of a 44 rise in CER for 1980-2005. The CEI 2005 for UK was 1.10, primarily as the result of a 165 rise in tertiary enrollment during the 1975-1995 period from 19 to 50. UKs TER rose by another 20 between 1995 and 2005, but the impact will reflect in CEI values only from 2006 onwards. Other countries still have enormous scope for raising CER at primary and secondary level. Indias net secondary enrollment rate is 90. Another 91 countries have net SER lower than India. It is noteworthy that of the countries studied, the five which recorded the highest growth rates in CEI were all OECD countries that had already attained high absolute levels of enrollment, signifying the scope for further progress on CEI even at the top of the scale. As a reflection of this potential, high school drop-out rates in US have declined by a third since 1995. 95 Tertiary enrollment in USA (82) now lags behind Korea (92) Japan (55) and Italy (64) still have considerable scope for progress. The high quality of education is shown by several other indicators, e. g. the ranking of the best universities and through indicators assessing research and development productivity. According to these scores the USA, the UK, Japan and Germany are at the very top. Nevertheless, none of such indicators are useful for assessing economic progress toward achieving welfare and human well-being and therefore, they have not been included. Table 6: Changes in CEI from 1985 to 2005 for select countries Table 6 presents changes in CEI from 1985 to 2005 for select countries. The left hand columns provide the actual CERH enrollment figures for 1980 to 2005 and the total change over 25 years (CER H25 ). The center column measures the overall 25 year index for CER H25 from 1980-2005 (e. g. a value of 1.50 indicates 50 rise in CER H over 25 years, equivalent to 2 a year). The right hand section shows the average rate of enrollment growth as measured by CER from 1980 and 2005. Korea recorded the highest 25 year average (1.70) followed by Sweden (1.40). The USA and Japan recorded the lowest level of improvement over time (1.20), although its absolute levels of enrollment in 2005 rank only second to Korea. CEI does not address the very important issue of quality of education, which varies very widely both within and between countries. Since 2000, PISA, Programme for International Student Assessment, has been measuring performance of 15 year olds on reading, mathematics and science literacy. Currently 30 OECD and 27 non-OECD countries are participating. China and India are not included. Future versions of CEI may be modified to incorporate the qualitative dimension of education based on PISA. Our approach does not diminish the inherent value of education as an endowment in its own right or its wider contribution to social development, human welfare and well-being. Our purpose here is only to recognize its role as an investment in future economic welfare. 10.5 Environment The startling findings presented in the Club of Romes report Limits to Growth alerted the world to the imminent danger inherent in the economic model prevalent at the time. Since then many things have changed, but the fundamental premise remains valid. Here, too, a new theoretical framework is needed which recognizes environmental sustainability as an essential component of sustainable human welfare and identifies the principles by which these apparently disparate objectives can be most effectively reconciled. It is not sufficient to say that we cannot sustain current levels of resource consumption or call for a halt in economic growth. We must also take into account the changing composition of economic activity from products to services, the impact of technological advances that develop new energy sources and increase energy efficiency, the impact of education and culture on resource consumption, the rising aspirations of the developing world, and factors influencing changes in life style, as well as the political and social sustainability. New theory means new thought, new conception. Our view of the relationship between human activity and our natural environment must change radically. M. Max-Neff pointed out that over time more and more economic activity is self-canceling from a welfare perspective. For every society there seems to be a period in which economic growth brings an improvement in the quality of life, but only up to the point the threshold beyond which, if there is more economic growth, quality of life may begin to deteriorate. 96 The abrupt differences between GDP and several other indicators, e. g. energy consumption, quality of life, and happiness, etc. are similar manifestations of the Max-Neff effect. 97 Historical analyses may show that GDP was a very good indicator to achieve political and economic objectives earlier in the last century but today it leads to wrong conclusions and bad decisions resulting in destruction of the environment, missed opportunities and misuse of human capital. Nevertheless, many argue that GDP is correlated with several important socioeconomic indicators, e. g. there is a linear correlation between GDPcapita and personal well-being of EU member states. 98 Correlations do not and cannot prove that any indicator is reliable and that policies and decisions based on that indicator are not wrong. Rankings by GPI and ISEW as well as International Index of Social Progress (IISP) drastically differ from GDP, e. g. the USA is ranked 27th according to IISP. 99 Many attempts have been made to incorporate measures of sustainability in composite indices. GPI and ISEW discount consumption for the depletion of or damage to environmental resources by deducting estimated costs associated with water, air and noise pollution as well as those resulting from the loss of wetlands, farmland, primary forests, CO2 damage and ozone depletion. Natural resources depletion is valued by measuring the investment necessary to generate a perpetual equivalent stream of renewable substitutes. Sen and Stigliz observed that these and similar measures such as Green GDP do not characterize ecological sustainability per se or assess how far we are from achieving sustainability targets. 100 Another composite index, the Ecological Footprint (EF), attempts to measure the impact of human activities on the regenerative capacity of the biosphere by calculating the amount of biologically productive land and water area required to support a given population at its current level of consumption and resources. EF couches the results in units of land rather than market prices. These approaches offer valuable insight into the true costs and sustainability of current economic activity. At the same time they introduce elements of complexity and subjective valuation which prevent their widespread acceptance and adoption as the basis for policy-making. They also depend on access to reliable data which is not available for most countries. There is certainly a need for indices that assign value to natural resources and the costs associated with pollution, as well as the inherent risks and uncertainties of current economic models. While recognizing the value of these comprehensive efforts to sustainable economic activity, the authors propose a more modest and limited approach to factoring environment concerns into a composite index of economic welfare, one which can be adopted worldwide based on available data. For this purpose, we focus on a single dimension of sustainability, fossil energy efficiency. Eurostat includes the ratio between the gross inland consumption of energy (coal, electricity, oil, natural gas and renewable energy sources available for consumption) and the GDP as an index of energy efficiency. From 1980 to 2007, energy efficiency as measured by GDP per unit of energy consumed in 2005 international dollars has improved substantially, ranging from an increase of 25 in Japan and 27 France to 71 in India and USA, 88 in UK and 200 in China. 101 This indicator reveals a progressive decoupling of energy use from GDP growth as the result of the shift from industry towards services and within industry to less energy-intensive activities the closure of inefficient, high-polluting units as well as end-use efficiency gains, such as lower energy-consuming appliances. The objective here is to measure human economic welfare rather than sound environmental practices or quality of life per se, however important these goals may be. Sustainability of economic activities is an essential aspect of economic welfare. Therefore, it is essential that it be reflected in any measure of economic welfare. The authors propose an Energy Efficiency Index (EEI) designed to promote policy-decisions that will reduce dependence on fossil fuels, while promoting improvements in the overall efficiency of all forms of energy consumption as a contribution to economic sustainability. The index takes into account only energy generated from fossil fuel sources, since fossil fuel based energy consumes non-renewable resources and releases CO2 into the atmosphere. Some may argue that the effort to assign value to reduced dependence on fossil fuels is necessarily subjective and arbitrary, and therefore inappropriately included in a composite measure of economic welfare. This points to the underlying insufficiency of the prevailing economic concept of value discussed in Section 4 of this paper. As Orio Giarini has so aptly stressed, economic value in a modern service economy cannot be divorced from risk and uncertainty. No greater risk or uncertainty confronts economy today than the future risks of ecological disaster. We need only reflect on the central purpose and methods of valuation employed by the insurance industry to realize that we assign concrete economic value to risks and uncertainties all the time. That value may be related to the anticipated costs of avoidance or the costs of remediation or some less tangible value of security. In order to assess efficiency of energy usage for economic welfare rather than for economic growth, EEI is based on the ratio of fossil fuel energy consumption (FFEC) to total human economic consumption expenditure (HWE) not to GDP. EEI is calculated as the percentage change in the ratio of fossil fuel energy consumption to HWE over time. Like education, investments in energy generation have a long gestation period, which ranges from about one year for wind turbines to 5 years or more for nuclear power, and an even longer period of utilization, which averages 30 years. Thus, each increase in the percentage of fossil fuel energy efficiency represents a long term investment in sustainability with repercussions for many years to come. Since improvements in energy efficiency can also be achieved by short term measures such as use of energy efficient lighting or refrigeration, we estimate the life span of the enhancements as a much shorter period of 10 years, though it is probably much higher. The index measures the changes in fossil fuel energy efficiency over time, where FFEC 1 and FFEC 0 represent fossil fuel energy consumption in year one and the previous year, and HWE 1 and HWE 0 represent human welfare consumption expenditure year one and the previous year. FFER is the ratio of fossil fuel energy consumption to HWE. FFER 1 is the change in the ratio for year one. FFER - 1 is the change in the ratio the previous year. FFER -2 . etc. are defined analogously. EEI for any year assigns present value (VFFER) to changes in FFER during the previous 10 years as represented by FFER -1 . FFER -2 . FFER -10 . VFFER starts with a value of 1 and diminished at the rate of 0.1 per year. Thus, VFFER-1 1, VFFER-2 0.9, VFFER-3 0.8. VFFER-11 0.0. Energy Efficiency Index EEI1 1 - (0.1 x FFER -1 ) (0.2 x FFER -2 ) . (1.0 x FFER -10 ) As EEI increases, the number within brackets becomes more negative in value. EEI increases either as a result of improving overall energy efficiency per unit of HWE or by replacing fossil fuel with renewable energy sources, i. e. either by decreasing FFEC or by increasing HWE. Table 7 shows the fossil fuel consumption (FFEC) per unit of human consumption expenditure (HWE), FFEC as a of total energy consumption, and the derived Energy Efficiency Index (EEI) for select countries. FFEC as a of total energy indicates the extent of dependence on fossil fuel energy sources vs. renewable energy sources, which ranges from a low of 36 in Sweden to a high of 93 in China. 102 FFEC per unit of HWE (in constant 2005 intl dollars) ranges from a low of 4683 btu per dollar in Sweden to a high of 30,386 btu in China, a factor of 6.4. About 60 of this difference is the result of Swedens lower dependence on fossil fuel energy sources in comparison to China. The remainder of the difference is due to Swedens higher overall energy efficiency. EEI measures the change in the FFECHWE ratio between 1995 and 2005. Values greater than 1.0 indicate decreasing use of fossil fuels andor increasing HWE. While Chinas FFEC rose by 90 during this period due to a huge expansion of manufacturing capacity, HWE rose 104, resulting in an EEI of 1.04. Russias FFEC rose only 5 during the same period, while its HWE rose by 54, resulting in an EEI of 1.05. The full benefits of these improvements will only be reflected by 2015. We were unable to include Russia in Table 8, due to the absence of reliable data during the period immediately prior to and subsequent to the breakup of the USSR. Thus, data on Russias EEI for the period 1995-2005 must be taken with caution. Table 7: Total energy consumption per (2000) dollar GDP, Fossil fuel consumption (FFEC) per unit of human consumption expenditure (HWE), FFEC as of total energy consumption, and the derived Energy Efficiency Index (EEI) for select countries. FFECHWE is in BTU per (2005) dollar. HWE is in constant 2005 PPP. Values are calculated for year 2005 Indias FFEC rose by 42 while its HWE rose by 72, resulting in an EEI of 1.06. Spains FFEC rose 54 while its HWE rose only 46, resulting in a decline in overall fossil fuel energy efficiency as reflected by an EEI of 0.94. Of the countries studied, the only other one to report a decline in energy efficiency was Brazil with a CEI of 0.98. 103 Three countries USA, UK and Sweden registered EEIs of more than 1.10. Table 8 presents historical data on changes in fossil fuel energy efficiency per unit of economic welfare from 1975 to 2005 as measured in terms of energy units per unit of HWE. It also shows the historical values for EEI from 1985 to 2005 and a 30 year average of the change in FFECHWE (EEI30). Of the nine countries studied, only Korea and India recorded a decline in fossil fuel energy efficiency over the period 1975-2005, as reflected in EEI30 values of less than 1.00. China registered the largest improvement over the 30 year period (65), followed by Sweden (63), UK (57) and USA (56). Table 8: Trends in Energy Efficiency Index (EEI) from 1985 to 2005 for select countries. FFECHWE is in BTU per dollar 11. Human Economic Welfare Index (HEWI) Based on the analysis discussed above, we propose the creation of a new composite index that focuses on the economic dimension of human welfare. This approach can be fairly criticized as too narrow, since it gives less prominence to the issue of long term sustainability than alternatives such as GPI and ISEW. We acknowledge the validity of the criticism, but argue that an index is a tool whose ultimate value must be judged by its utility. Other indices may offer greater insight, but their inherent complexity and subjectivity as well as the difficulty in obtaining data diminishes their value as a tool for policy-making and international comparisons. This index has been constructed with the following objectives: each component indicator should be reliable, easily and promptly available, sensitive, robust, and uniquely related to its own objective the components should be incorporated in the composite index in such a manner that there is no cancellation and in contrast to more comprehensive composite indicators, the number of sub-indices should be kept to the minimum possible. These objectives have been only partially met. 11.1 Characteristics of HEWI 1. It is denominated in international dollars adjusted for purchasing power parity. 2. It is based on data that is currently maintained by international organizations and available for 70 countries. Though we have already emphasized that some of the data is not entirely reliable, it is the best and most consistent available and free from value assessment. 104 3. It is meant for use as a tool, as a policy-instrument and education of the public. Improvements in performance on HEWI are designed to broadly reflect real improvements in present and future welfare. 11.2 Limitations in HEWI It may be useful at the outset to clarify some of the limitations in this approach. 1. It partially overcomes the distorting impact of GDP by focusing on those aspects of national income that directly benefit human beings, but it does not adjust the value of national product to reflect non-monetized activities, risk and uncertainty, price distortions and the true value of quality. The absence of qualitative measures is especially relevant for assessment of progress on education and employment. 2. It is a rough indicator of sustainable development, since it does not fully reflect the real costs and risks associated with over-consumption of natural resources, pollution and other ecological, social and political issues. 3. It measures economic change, not social development, by monitoring some key determinants of sustainable economic welfare. It does not attempt to assess the underlying social, organizational, technological and cultural factors that contribute to the capacity of society to adapt and evolve over time or to the impact of social change on life styles, happiness or psychological fulfillment. 4. As with any index for international comparisons, it is constrained by the paucity and low quality of the information related to personal disposable income, inequality, employment and education. 11.3 Components of HEWI HEWI improves upon GDP per capita as a measure of human economic welfare in six ways: 1. Personal Disposable Income (PDI) It focuses on that part of national income which directly accrues to households and individuals for promoting human welfare, thereby avoiding the tendency to value growth for growths sake. 2. Human Welfare Expenditure (HWE) It focuses only on that part of private and public expenditure that directly promotes the welfare of human beings. 3. Income Inequality (EWI) It adjusts per capita income to reflect the impact of income inequality on household economic welfare. 4. Full Employment (FEI) It takes into account levels of employment and unemployment which directly impact on personal economic welfare and utilization of human capital. 5. Combined Educational Enrollment (CEI) It considers the future economic impact of current investments in education. 6. Energy Efficiency (EEI) It includes a measure for changes in fossil fuel energy efficiency over time as an index of ecological risk and sustainability. Each of these components has been discussed separately in Section 10. This section summarizes each sub-index, discusses how they can be assembled into a composite index, and examines comparative data. 11.4 Sustainability HEWI is based on a broad conception of sustainability that incorporates economic, ecological and social factors. It is structured to give balanced weightage to current and future welfare. In addition to measuring personal disposable income and welfare-related consumption, it monitors two negative components that limit present welfare income inequality and unemployment and three positive components that have the potential to significantly enhance long term sustainability education, energy efficiency and net household savings. Income inequality is viewed as a constraint on growth of consumer demand, which limits present consumption and employment. Unemployment is viewed as a constraint on the full utilization of human resources and social productivity, which limits the economic welfare of both the unemployed and the rest of society. Rising levels of education are viewed as an investment in human capital that promotes future economic welfare. Rising levels of fossil fuel energy efficiency are viewed as an investment in physical capital that supports future ecological welfare. Net household savings provides the financial basis for future investment and human welfare consumption. Figure 7: Dimensions of sustainable economic welfare 12. Composite HEWI The design of the component sub-indices and composite index are intended to provide a tool that is of maximum value for policy and decision-making. 12.1 Consumption Expenditure (HWE) HWE represents the consumer and household-related components of GDP that most closely relate to the welfare of human beings. Comparative data for all countries is taken primarily from the UN, which presently maintains national accounts information in a common standard format for 70 countries. The calculation of HWE starts with the household consumption expenditure (HCE) component of GDP as the base, thereby omitting other GDP components related to capital formation, change in inventories, imports and exports. It then adds in those categories of government expenditure directly related to personal welfare (HWGE), including education (Ed), health (He), housing and community amenities (HC), social protection (SP), environmental protection (EP), recreation, culture and religion (RCR), thereby omitting expenditure on general public services, defense, public order and safety, and economic affairs. The sum of the above two components is divided by the total population to derive the per capita HWE. Then per capita HWE is adjusted for 2005 international dollars PPP. HWE serves as the baseline which is adjusted by the other four sub-indices. On average the value of HWE ranges between 60 and 80 of GDP. Thus, HWE HCE HWGE (Ed He HC SP EP RCR) 12.2 Personal Disposable Income (PDI) PDI represents that portion of national income which is directly available to individuals for consumption expenditure after taxes. It is derived by extracting from GDP the data for household consumption expenditure (HCE) and adding to it the net household savings (NHS). 12.2.1 Economic Welfare Index (EWI) The economic welfare of the population can vary widely between two countries with the same per capita income, if in one case a large percentage of GDP goes to the top 10 or 20, while in the other it is more evenly distributed throughout the population. Therefore, HWE is adjusted to take into account the impact of income inequality on the real economic welfare of people. Here our objective is not to measure income inequality per se, which is simply a statistical result, but rather to measure the impact the stimulating and depressing effect of income inequality on overall human economic welfare as measured by HWE. As discussed in Section 9.2, income inequality plays both a positive and negative role in economic progress. Within certain limits it acts as a gradient or voltage differential that spurs people to aspire and strive to elevate their position to equal or exceed that of others. At the same time it concentrates disproportionate income among those with the lowest propensity to consume and the highest propensity to speculate, thereby curtailing demand for greater production and employment. Economic Welfare Index (EWI), is a variant of Sens SWF, in which we adjust Gini to arrive at a new coefficient, Gec, which represents that proportion of Gini that is compatible with optimal levels of economic welfare as measured by household consumption expenditure. Gec increases in value as Gini rises, reflecting the fact that high Gini countries have a greater potential for reducing inequality without dampening economic incentives that promote human welfare. Gec 0.65 Gini - 0.1 EWI is personal disposable income (PDI) multiplied by G ec plus Government Welfare consumption expenditure on households (HWGE). Note that HWGE is not adjusted by G ec since the distribution of government services is far more equitable than the distribution of income and consumption expenditure and is skewed in favor of lower income families. EWI PDI (1 - G ec ) HWGE EWI PDI (1.1 - 0.65G) HWGE 12.2.2 Full Employment (FEI) Section 10.3 discussed the importance of incorporating some measure of employment in an index of human economic welfare. In a market economy where economic survival and well-being depend on each individuals access to gainful employment, employment must be regarded as a basic human right. Rising levels of unemployment is both OECD and developing countries among youth as well as among older workers represents one of the greatest obstacles to securing economic welfare for all. Employment is related to changes in demography, education and social attitudes, such as those regarding women in the workforce. No single measure of employment can satisfactorily capture all its dimensions. Unfortunately in many countries even the most basic data on unemployment rates is unreliable, while the range of variables measured is severely limited. The composition of an employment index useful for international comparisons must work within these constraints. FEI is a composite index that takes into account levels of employment and unemployment which directly impact on personal economic welfare and national utilization of human capital. FEI is a composite index that takes into account levels of employment and unemployment which directly impact on personal economic welfare and national utilization of human capital. Employment-Population Index EPI is arrived at by taking the Employment-Population Ratio (EPR) for those aged 25 and converting it into a scale ranging from .01 to 1, assuming that 66 EPR represents full employment. Countries with EPR greater than 66 are assigned a value of 1.0. Adult Employment Index AEI measures the rate of employment among members of the labour force aged 25. The adult unemployment rate is derived by deducting from total employment and unemployment data, those under 25 years of age. Adult underemployment is estimated by taking twice the level of adult unemployment. Thus, AEI 1- 2(AUR). Youth Employment Index YEI measures the rate of employment among members of the labour force aged 15-24. It is derived by taking 1 minus the youth unemployment rate for ages 15-24 (YUR). In consideration of the great importance of providing employment opportunities to the young generation, we have assigned an equal weightage to YEI and AEI, even though the percentage of youth in the workforce ranges from 10 to 50 in different countries. YEI 1 - YUR. Job Creation Index JCR measures the net change in the total number of jobs from year to year, which serves as the basis for the index, JCI. JCI (1JCR) JCI 1 ((TE 2 - TE 1 )TE 1 ) where TE 1 amp TE 2 are total employment in the previous and subsequent year. A value less than one for JCI signifies a decline in total employment from the previous year. A value of more than one signifies an increase in employment. Thus, a growth rate of employment of 10 would be indicated by a value of 1.10. 12.2.3 Full Employment Index (FEI) is a composite index equal to the average of the four sub-indices. FEI could be greater than 1.0 if JCI is very large. FEI is expressed by the formula The function EWIFEI reflects the impact of employment on human economic welfare. 12.2.4 Combined Educational Enrollment Index (CEI) CEI considers the future economic impact of current investments in education based on current school enrollment rates. It is based on the combined gross enrollment rates for primary (PER), secondary (SER) and tertiary (TER) levels normalized to 100 by UNDP and incorporated in the HDI index (CGER). CGER is modified to assign double weightage to changes in tertiary enrollment rates. We designate this modified CGER as CER H . CER H 0.33 PER 0.23 SER 0.44 TER In recognition of the time lag between acquisition of education and its impact on economic activity, we define the Combined Education Index (CEI) through CER n . CER n measures the absolute change in combined enrollment levels over time given by formula (6a). CEI measures the cumulative impact of that change on human economic welfare at any point during 25 years in time subsequent to the change in CER H . As the more educated youth enter the workforce and the impact of rising levels of education gradually impacts on actual GDP and HWE, the factor multiplying CER n . i. e. 1, 0.9, 0.81 etc. for past educational achievements declines proportionately. Namely, we argue that the impact of earlier education enrollment is already included in the GDP and in our HWE. 12.3 Energy Efficiency (EEI) EEI is an index of sustainability based on fossil fuel energy efficiency (FFEC) per unit of consumption expenditure (HWE). The index measures the consumption of energy generated from fossil fuel sources, which are non-renewable and release CO2 into the atmosphere. Note that by basing the measure of fuel efficiency on HWE rather than GDP, which is commonly used, we assess the extent to which energy is being efficiently utilized for the ultimate benefit of human beings, not merely for production and growth for their own sake. In calculating EEI, we take into account the long gestation period and long life span of investments in renewable energy and energy efficiency. For the purpose of this study, we have used a period of 10 years. The index measures the change in fossil fuel energy efficiency over time, where FFEC 1 and FFEC 2 represent fossil fuel energy consumption in year one and two and HWE 1 and HWE 10 represent human welfare consumption expenditure year one and two. FFER is the ratio of fossil fuel to HWE. FFER1 is the change in the ratio for year one. FFER -1 is the change in the ratio the previous year. FFER -2 . etc. are defined analogously. The Energy Efficiency Index EEI for any year assigns present value (VFFER) to changes in FFER during the previous 10 years as represented by FFER -1 . FFER -2 FFER -10 . VFFER starts with a value of 1 and diminished at the rate of 0.1 per year. Thus, VFFER -1 1, VFFER -2 0.9, VFFER -3 0.8, . VFFER -11 0.0. EEI is given by As EEI increases, the number within brackets becomes more negative in value. EEI increases either as a result of improving overall energy efficiency per unit of HWE or by replacing fossil fuel with renewable energy sources, i. e. either by decreasing FFEC or by increasing HWE. 12.4 Human Economic Welfare Index (HEWI) We define the Human Economic Welfare Index by the formula: HEWI EWI FEI CEI EEI 12.4.1 HEWI 2005 In Table 9 below, columns A-C show the per capita GDP, PDI, and EWI (PDI adjusted for inequality in PPP 2005 international dollars). Columns D-F show scores on the indices for employment, education and energy. Columns G amp H show the final adjusted human welfare index HEWI and HEWI as a of per capita GDP. Data is for 2005. As we saw earlier, USA ranks 1st in GDP per capita with a value 28 higher than 2nd ranked UK but when compared in terms of HEWI, the US is only 11 higher. The GDP gap between USA and Sweden is 29, while in terms of HEWI it is 26. As we saw in Table 2, US retains a far larger percentage of GDP as personal disposable income (71 vs. 50 for Sweden). Sweden performs better on inequality and education, USA on employment and energy. Russia (85), UK (83) and India (76) record the highest values for HEWI as a percentage of GDP. South Africa (41), China (47) and Brazil (53) record the lowest ratio of HEWI to GDP. Figure 8 shows the relative differences between GDP, PDI, EWI and HEWI for year 2005. Table 9: HEWI as of GDPc, PDI and EWI. Values are for year 2005. Figure 8: GDPc, PDIc, EWIc and HEWI for year 2005 12.4.2 Historical HEWI 1985-2005 Table 10 presents historical data on HEWI for select countries from 1985 to 2005 along with their relative rank order during the period. We select here a few countries for historical analysis to illustrate how HEWI can be applied to gain insight into the development of human economic welfare over longer periods of time. 105 12.4.3 Discussion Our discussion concerns the period 1980 to 2005 and, therefore, omits the present economic crisis. In Table 9 we compare the performance of 16 countries on GDPc and with the proposed index HEWI, including the effects of each sub-index: PDI and EWI as well as FEI, CEI and EEI. This allows us to assess whether and if, to what extent, HEWI provides better insight into changes in human economic welfare than GDPc. HEWI vs. GDP: Of the nine countries analyzed historically for the period 1985 to 2005, Korea, as well as China, registered the largest increase in HEWI (202), while its per capita GDP also grew by 202. Thus, HEWI rose at the very same rate as GDP, signifying that country followed a human welfare-oriented development strategy. HWGE: Progress on the human welfare index was buoyed by a 262 rise in Government welfare-related expenditure, signifying a conscious effort of the government to direct the gains of economic growth for human welfare. G ec . Korea scores relatively well on income inequality with a G ec value of 0.10, down from 0.12 in 1975 and a Gini of 0.31 in 2005. This is the lowest value of the countries studied after Sweden, demonstrating its serious commitment to the equitable distribution of the gains of economic growth. Recall that G ec measures income inequality against a hypothetical state of optimal welfare inequality in which both overall human welfare and equitable distribution are in optimal balance. FEI: Korea maintained one of the highest performances of any country on the employment index, averaging 0.96 on FEI over 20 years, as shown in Table 4. CEI: Koreas combined enrollment rate (CER H25 ) rose from 0.56 to 0.96 in 25 years, giving it the highest CER H25 value of 1.70 of all the countries studied. EEI: These impressive gains were offset to some extent by a gradual increase in Koreas energy intensity as a result of heavy dependence on manufacturing in the composition of its economic growth, which constitutes 39 of Korean GDP vs. 22 for USA and Japan and 25 for the EU). The country remains dependent on fossil fuel for 85 of its energy needs, down from 98 in 1975. According to International Energy Agency, Koreas overall energy intensity for all forms of energy (measured in terms of GDP per unit energy consumption) declined 54 from 1980 to 2006, but still overall energy intensity per unit of GDP is high compared with many OECD countries, 50 higher than USA and almost double that of Japan. 106 Although energy intensity per unit of GDP declined, fossil fuel intensity per unit of HWE actually rose between 1975 (the base year for the 1985 EEI) and 2005 as shown by the value for EEI30 of 0.78 in Table 8, signifying a significant decline in fossil fuel energy efficiency over 30 years, although the trend has reversed after 2000, probably as the result of a 22 rise in HWE vs. a 15 rise in FFEC. Korea still pursues an energy intensive and fossil fuel energy intense strategy which is unsustainable and a poor model for other nations to emulate. The lengthy discussion of EEI is necessitated by the fact that we have not divided the index into sub-indices that transparently reveal the sources of variation in the overall index, an omission to be corrected in future versions. Thus, HEWI provides both an overview of Koreas progress on human welfare as well as insights into the sustainability of its strategy. It scores impressively on development of human capital through high investment in education, high levels of employment and continuous gains on income distribution. Excessive dependence on an energy-intensive fossil fuel strategy represents Koreas largest obstacle to sustainable human welfare, although the most recent trend is encouraging. With the crucial exception of energy, Koreas performance demonstrates that progressive welfare related strategies can significantly magnify the welfare benefits of economic growth in a sustainable manner. HEWI vs. GDP: In contrast, Japans HEWIc rose just 1 between 1985 and 2005, the smallest gains of any country studied, in spite of a 44 growth in GDPc during this period. HCE amp HWGE: Government welfare expenditure grew faster (110) than GDP, while growth of household expenditure just kept pace with GDP. Inequality declined by 19 over the 20 years as a result of this government transfer. NHS: Net savings declined from 12 to 1 of GDP, signifying that households are relying increasingly on past savings and current debt to sustain their high level of personal consumption. G ec . The level of income inequality has declined by 19, from a G ec value of 0.13 in 1985 to 0.11 in 2005. While this performance was better than most countries, which recorded a rise in inequality during this period, the gains were modest and the absolute level of inequality leaves considerable scope for further reduction. FEI: Although once regarded as a model for employment security, Japans employment index declined by 5 since 1985 to 0.93 in 2005. CEI: Japans CER H25 is 1.2, reflecting an increase in CER H from 67 to 78 during the period 1980-2005. This growth rate ranks lowest of the countries studied along with USA, but the absolute level of enrollment in USA is far higher (90 vs. 78 for Japan). EEI: Although Japans overall energy efficiency (gdp per unit energy) improved 25 from 1975 to 2005, its fossil fuel efficiency for human welfare (FFECHWE) as measured by EEI rose 46. Significant gains were achieved up to 1990 while GDP was still growing rapidly. Since then progress on EEI has been negligible. From 1995 to 2005, Japans EEI averaged 1.02. Japan still remains highly dependent on fossil fuels for 91 of its total energy. In absolute terms, Japans FFECHWE is equivalent to the average of all the countries studied, excluding China. Its current fossil fuel energy efficiency is 89 higher than Korea, 278 higher than China, and 20 better than USA. In combination, these indices indicate a country which has stagnated both economically and in terms of its efforts to boost human welfare. During this period, levels of household savings and employment declined, education grew slowly, and inequality declined slightly. Improvement on EEI is the most notable gain for Japan during the period, but its high dependence on fossil fuels makes this present course unsustainable. China amp India HEWI vs. GDP: When viewed from a historical perspective, Chinas position relative to India changes dramatically. Although China started in 1985 from a GDPc (PPP) 19 lower than Indias and a HEWI 22 lower, Chinas GDP has risen by 401 and its HEWI by 202. In contrast, Indias GDP rose by 122 and its HEWI by 108, signifying slower growth but growth more oriented to human welfare than in China. HCE amp HWGE: Chinas household consumer expenditure has grown (223) at just half the rate of GDP growth, while Indias increased 79 in real terms. Chinas government welfare-related spending grew even faster than GDP (463), while Indias grew at a slightly slower pace than GDP (118). NHS: Both countries achieved notable gains in net household savings. Chinas rose from 10 to 24 of personal disposable income, while Indias grew from 19 to 30. G ec . Income inequality in China has risen by 63 as measured by G ec . whereas Indias increased by a much lower value of 29, which has significant impact on the distribution of economic gains throughout the population. FEI: Historical data from ILO for both China and India indicate a continuously high score on employment, but the reliability of this data is highly questionable, so we prefer to discount its value. CEI: India started out with a lower enrollment base (29 lower in 1975) as measured by CER H than China (42), however it has grown at nearly twice the rate with a CER H25 of 1.5 vs. 1.3 for China. Both countries have enormous scope for enhancing both the quantity and quality of education. Indeed, investment in education may be the single most important lever for enhancing human economic welfare in both countries. EEI: Chinas total energy intensity per unit GDP has declined by 63 over the past three decades, but its absolute energy intensity is still double that of Japan and 46 higher than Indias. 107 Both countries depend on fossil fuels for more than 90 of their energy needs. Indias fossil fuel energy efficiency (FFECHWE) is about one-third that of China, meaning India produces nearly three times more HWE per unit of fossil fuel. Chinas performance on EEI has declined drastically from 1.22 in 1985 to 1.04 in 2005, signifying much slower progress on this factor than in the past. In both absolute terms and in terms of trends, China is pursuing an unsustainable and inefficient path for enhancing human economic welfare. In this context, China has taken considerable effort in recent years to develop renewable energy resources in order to address this imbalance. Today China produces more than half of the worlds supply of solar panels and almost half its wind turbines. HEWI vs. GDP: USAs real per capita GDP (PPP) grew by 46 from 1985-2005, while per capita economic welfare as measured by HEWI rose just 9. By comparison, UKs GDP grew by 60 while its HEWI rose by 74. Among OECD countries, the US performance was slightly better than Japans 1 and Italys 4, but far below Koreas 202 and Spains 104. Although USA retained the first rank in GDP and HEWI among the countries studied throughout the period, the difference between US and second ranked UK in GDP shrank from 40 in 1985 to 28 in 2005 and in HEWI it shrank from 76 to 11. HCE amp HWGE: US household consumption expenditure rose by 54 and government welfare-related expenditure rose 33 over the two decades. By comparison, UKs HCE rose 80 and its HWGE rose 63. NHS: US net household savings declined from 9 to zero during the same period, while UK NHS fell from 10 to 4. G ec . Welfare related income inequality as measured by G ec in the USA rose 21 from 0.12 to 0.15, which means that human welfare as measured by HEWI is reduced by 15 due to non-optimal income distribution. Of course, the actual levels of income inequality as measured by Gini are much higher at 0.38 in 2005. By comparison, UKs G ec rose by 50, but remains 20 lower in absolute terms at 0.12. FEI: US performance on employment remained constant over the 20 years (.92-.93), though its FEI has fallen by an estimated 4 since 2005. UKs employment performance has risen nearly to USA levels, rising from 0.86 in 1985 to 0.91 in 2005. CEI: From 1980 to 2005, US raised its overall CER H25 by 20, which largely reflects a rise in tertiary enrollment from 56 to 82. By comparison, UK raised its CER H25 40, including a 212 rise in tertiary enrollment from 19 to 59. During this period, US fell from first to second place in both total enrollment and tertiary enrollment behind Korea. EEI: In terms of overall energy efficiency measured by GDP per unit energy consumed, both UK and US reduced its energy intensity by 42 between 1980 and 2006. In absolute terms, UK produces 69 more GDP per unit of energy than USA. Both countries remain highly dependent on fossil fuels 85 in USA, 89 in UK. Both substantially improved fossil fuel energy efficiency as measured in terms of FFEC per unit HWE from 1975 to 2005 the US by 56 and UK by 57 as shown in Table 8. As a result of these differences in performance, UK has substantially closed the gap with USA on HEWI. It performs substantially better on HCE, HWGE, NHS, significantly better on Gec and slightly better on EEI. On FEI US scores higher, but remained flat while UK raised its performance. Although there is still a 28 gap in GDP between the two countries, the UKs continuously higher investment in education is likely to reduce that difference significantly. Based on present trends, its HEWI may exceed the US level over the next few years. The comparative historical analysis is not intended to be comprehensive or in-depth, but rather to illustrate how HEWI and its sub-indices can be utilized to gain insight into the real impact of economic growth on human welfare and some of the critical policy issues that need to be addressed in order to enhance that performance. For the latest information and research papers on HEWI and its sub-indices, our statistical methods and the country studies, please visit the HEWI project pages on neweconomictheory. org 108 or at mssresearch. org . 13. Conclusions 13.1 Economic Policy Implications of HEWI In contrast to most other composite economic indicators developed or proposed in recent years, HEWI incorporates a minimum number of sub-indicators. In addition, each indicator is uniquely related to its own objective and there is no cancellation effect between the sub-indices. In this way the policy implications of each measure can be derived from the individual sub-indices and the resultant measure is made transparent to facilitate decision-making. Of course, we readily concede the limitations of this broad approach. For instance, FEI does not distinguish between the type or quality of new jobs created, whether they are in healthcare and education or in the military, construction and road building, whether these jobs generate pollution or improve energy efficiency. Therefore, although FEI does measure components of employment, it is only a partial quantitative measure. Similar constraints apply to CEI and EEI as well. In spite of these inadequacies, we believe that HEWI can serve as relevant and useful tool for assessment and decision-making. The relationship between measurement, theory and decision-making may be usefully illustrated by comparing economy and health care. The principal aim of both activities is to promote human well-being. Both activities are extremely complex. Healthcare draws on knowledge from the life sciences, fields which are based on sound theory. Measurements are used extensively in health care to formulate diagnoses. Some health care measurements, e. g. X-rays, are useful, but at the same time detrimental to the patient. The decision whether or not to apply these measures requires careful assessment of the patients condition, always keeping in mind the essential goal, human well-being. Although healthcare is based on sound underlying theory, it is subject to real uncertainties and risks, as it is based on incomplete information, which sometimes generates unexpected complications and cascading negative consequences. Comparing this chaotic behavior with the butterfly effect observed in classical physics underlines the enormous complexity in healthcare as well as economy. The status of theory in economy is far less satisfactory. We use mathematical models, but we lack adequate theory to explain underlying causes, social processes and consequences. We also face extreme difficulties in obtaining precise, timely information. In economy also measurements can be detrimental, as in the case of GDP. Wrong, inaccurate or misleading measures, rightly or wrongly applied, can lead to wrong public policy as well as wrong perceptions and actions by the general public. In healthcare our aim is to restore the patient to normal health not to fully understand the problem, though understanding the problem certainly helps. In economy we start from a position of insufficiency characterized by widespread poverty, endemic underemployment, inadequate development of human capital, financial instability and activities with dangerously unsustainable environmental consequences. In healthcare, illness represents a disturbance of the natural harmony of the human body, which may be acute or chronic. In economy, too, both acute and chronic imbalances are possible. Indications are that the present system is perpetually out of balance. Here we will never succeed in evolving effective and sustainable policies until we arrive at a more comprehensive theoretical knowledge on which to base our actions. Until then we must have the frankness and modesty to admit the limits to our knowledge and the insufficiency of our measures. With this qualification in mind, the development and application of new measures such as HEWI can be of great practical value for enhancing public policy and initiative. HEWI seeks to provide policy-makers with a clear and focused set of indicators that can serve as a basis for a broad range of initiatives designed to enhance human or household economic welfare with a focus on future sustainability. While the composite HEWI can serve as an overall index of progress, the component indices and their sub-indices can provide specific guidance on ways to improve overall performance. For example, performance on the Full Employment Index (FEI) can be directly enhanced by measures which reduce youth and adult unemployment, raise the employment to population ratio or stimulate net new job creation. Other policy measures that can be directly deduced and monitored by HEWI include: 1. Redirect national expenditure from non-consumer-related categories of expenditure such as defense and general administration to greater investments in human welfare. 2. Revise policies to reduce income inequality, which might include minimum wage legislation, land reform, increased investment in education, labor market policies, innovative tax and transfer policies such as changes in employee taxation and capital gains as well as taxing of speculative investments and foreign exchange transactions. 3. Promote full employment policies such as national legislation guaranteeing the right to work, temporary public job programs, vocational training programs, work-for-welfare, entrepreneurship development, micro-credit, and internet-based self-employment programs. 4. Promote measures designed to increase energy efficiency, while shifting reliance from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources. 5. Provide financial and social incentives to raise educational enrollment rates, including national legislation to raise the mandatory minimum level of schooling by two years. 6. Promote development-oriented policies such as those that increase the speed of communication, transportation, financial transactions, technology dissemination and adoption, and government decision-making as a stimulus to all economic activity. 13.2 Beyond HEWI In this paper we have tried to emphasize the crucially important role that measurement plays in human progress and the justification for continuous efforts to improve existing measures and develop better ones. The paper examines some of the most widely-accepted limitations in GDP as a measure of human economic welfare and explores some alternative approaches to compensate for its deficiencies. We have drawn attention to the considerable challenges implicit in this effort, which are only partially addressed by alternative approaches, including our own. We have also tried to suggest that in an effort to evolve more comprehensive and inclusive indices, we should take care not to sacrifice clarity and specificity. We cannot overemphasize the potential value of precise information for enhancing economic welfare. While national accounts data is available for all OECD countries and for 70 countries through the UN, net household savings, disposable incomes, unemployment and reliable enrollment rates are not available for many countries. Availability is one thing, reliability is another. Too often governments feel constrained to manipulate data to meet domestic political concerns or international pressures, as the recent controversy over Greek financial reporting illustrates. The paucity of timely and reliable data is a serious impediment to immediate application of this and alternative measures on a global basis. More importantly, it is also a serious impediment to optimizing policy-making to maximize human welfare. Where data is available, it is also necessary to keep in mind that, like everything else, our accounting systems and measures are undergoing a process of evolution. Measurement of almost everything, everywhere is more accurate and comprehensive than in the past. Historical comparisons often reflect changes in our measures as much as they reflect changes in actual performance. As Indian leaders realized 30 years ago, data must always be validated by observable facts and confirmed by intuitive judgment. Ultimately, good measures must be judged by the policy decisions they engender. Therefore, we have tried to emphasize practical utility over technical perfection. Regardless of the inaccuracies and approximations they may contain, we believe HEWI and its sub-indices can provide sound direction for policies that focus on what must be considered the most central objective of every society enhancing human welfare, not economic growth for its own sake. Comparative rank order indices may be a source of pride or humiliation, and both can be serviceable if they prompt us and others to more effective action. Comprehensive composite indices alert us to crucial issues of sustainability, but may overwhelm us with so much information and so many priorities that they deter rather than facilitate concerted action. All indices incorporate arbitrary and subjective assumptions, whether implicit or explicit. GDP itself is a measure of gross economic activity, but it is widely being applied as an indicator of human welfare and social progress. As a measure of activity it contains faults, but it may still be serviceable for some purposes. As an indicator of economic or social welfare, it is deeply flawed and dangerously misleading. Our objective here has been to present the framework for an indicator of economic welfare derived from GDP that compensates for some, but not all, of its most serious deficiencies. We seek to illustrate the potential for an alternative approach which offers considerable advantages and yet keeps centrally focused on human economic welfare. Many commendable efforts are underway to improve on measurement of economic performance, some more narrowly and others more broadly focused than HEWI. There is a place and role for numerous approaches. The narrowest measures will help us to improve precision. The broadest serve as a constant reminder of the wider social and ecological context on which all economic activity is founded and carried out. An evolutionary perspective highlights the fact that economic growth is one expression of the more fundamental process of social development, which occurs simultaneously in all fields and determines the course of political, social, economic, demographic, ecological, and cultural progress. Thus far all of the indices related to economic and social development focus almost exclusively on the measurement of results. But as we described above, social development is not a result or even a set of results, but an on-going process of progress by which humanity acquires increasing knowledge, skill and organizational capacity to achieve the goals it aspires for. An index of end results serves a limited purpose by telling us how fast and how far we are moving in the right direction and how close we are to achieving the goals we aspire toward. But a process-based index will go much further. To the degree it is perfected, it will provide insight into the essential steps of the underlying social process as well as their sequencing and timing. We hope that this paper will act as an impetus for others to suggest necessary modifications and improvements to this as well as alternative frameworks. 1 Sombart, Werner. Medieval and Modern Commercial Enterprise, Enterprise and Secular Change, edited by Frederic C. Lane. and Riemersma, Jelle. Homewood. 1953. 25-40. 2 Caplow, Theodore. Ben J. Wattenberg. and Louis Hicks. The First Measured Century: An Illustrated Guide to Trends in America 1900-2000. New York: American Enterprise Institute Press, 2000. 3 Galbraith. Kenneth, John, The Great Crash 1929, New York: Mariner Books, 1954. 171, 182-3. 4 Cobb, Clifford, Ted Halstead and Rowe, Jonathan. If the GDP is Up, Why is America Down, Atlantic Monthly, October 1995, accessed August 2, 2010, theatlanticpastpoliticsecbiggdp. htm 5 Kuznets, Simon. National Income, 1929-1932. 73rd US Congress, 2d Session, Senate Document no. 124, 7, accessed August 2, 2010, library. bea. govuSOD,888 6 Kuznets, Simon. How to Judge Quality, New Republic, October 20, 1962, 29. 7 Nordhaus, William D. and James Tobi. Is Growth Obsolete, The Measurement of Economic and Social Performance, Studies in Income and Wealth, Vol. 38, NBER, 1973. Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 319, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. Accessed August 10, 2010, cowles. econ. yale. eduPcpp03bp0398ab. pdf 9 Diagnosis is based on a set of direct and indirect measurements summarized in a medically-formulated statement of a persons health. GDP as currently utilized in politics and economics is a diagnosis of a nations economic health, but an incorrect one. 10 Giarini, Orio. Jacobs, Garry. Lietaer, Bernard. and laus, Ivo. Introductory Paper for a Programme on The Wealth of Nations Revisited, European Papers on the New Welfare, No. 15, 2010. 11 Jacobs, Garry. Growth: The Real Symptoms, The Hindu, April 23, 1981. 12 Jacobs, Garry. Common Indicators of Development, The Hindu, April 24, 1981. 13 Jacobs, Garry. New Indicators of Development, The Hindu, May 5, 1981. 14 Giarini, Orio, Dialogue on Wealth and Welfare, Club of Rome, 1980. 15 Giarini, Orio, and Stahel, Walter. The Limits to Certainty, preface by Prigogine, Ilya. Dordrecht Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993. 16 Stahel, Walter R. Global Change, Acts of God, Acts of Man, Acts of Nature and Systemic Risks, Geneva Association Information Newsletter, May 2010, 3. Accessed August 5, 2010, genevaassociation. orgPortals0GenevaAssociationSystemicR. 18 Giarini. Dialogue on Wealth and Welfare, pag. 186. 19 Stiglitz, Joseph E. Sen, Amartya and Fitoussi, Jean-Paul. Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress, 2009, 8, Accessed August 23, 2010, stiglitz-sen-fitoussi. frdocumentsrapportanglais. pdf 20 Calculus and most mathematical models treat continuously varying phenomena. The catastrophe approach of French mathematician Rene Thom and his followers treats various sudden, catastrophic changes. The real behavior of economic development is not smooth. It is accentuated by dramatic sudden changes. Calculus was developed to treat classical mechanics, where from the saying that nature does not make junps followed. Quantum physics does make jumps. So do markets, economies and societies. 21 Brundtland, G. H. Et al. Our Common Future, Oxford University Press, 1987, 383. 23 UNDP, Human Development Index: Methodology and Measurement, 1994. Accessed August 20, 2010, hdr. undp. orgenmediaHDImethodology. pdf 24 Talberth, John. Cobb, Clifford. and Slattery, Noah. The Genuine Progress Indicator 2006, Redefining Progress, February 2007. Accessed August 4, 2010, lanecc. edusustainabilitydocumentsTalberthCobbSlattery. pdf 25 Carta, Valentina and Porcu, Mariano, Measures of Wealth and Well-being: A comparison between GDP and ISEW, Working Papers 201006, Centro Ricerche Economiche Nord Sud, Universit di Cagliari, April 2010, 19. 26 The analysis done in this paper is focused on per capita human economic welfare. Therefore all the major terms are per capita terms (whether or not it is specifically stated) except where aggregate figures are necessary for purposes of comparison or calculation. 27 Krugman, Paul. Japan, China and America, New York Times, September 13, 2010. 28 Aziz, Jahangir. and Cui, Li. Explaining Chinas Low Consumption: The Neglected Role of Household Income, IMF Working Paper, Asia and Pacific Department, WP07181, 2007, 4. 29 Mukkai, Saraswathi, Human Welfare, Consumption amp Income Inequality, MSS Research Working Papers, The Mothers Service Society, September 2010. Accessed August 5, 2010, mssresearch. orgqHumanWelfareConsumptionIncomeInequality 30 Russia: Shoppers Gone Wild, Bloomberg Business Week, Feb 20, 2006. Accessed September 1, 2010. businessweekmagazinecontent0608b3972071.htm 31 Notten, Gerander, and Denis de Crombrugghe, Poverty and Consumption Smoothing in Russia, Maastricht Graduate School of Management, Working Paper, MGSoG2006WP004, 2006. Accessed September 12, 2010, governance. unimaas. nlhomepublications2006WP004.pdf 32 Gorodnichenko, Yuriy. Klara Sabirianova Peter and Stolyarov, Dmitriy, Inequality and Volatility Moderation in Russia: Evidence from Micro-Level Panel Data on Consumption and Income, Discussion Paper, No. 4233, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Germany, June 2009, 14. ftp. iza. orgdp4233.pdf 33 Cornia, Giovanni Andrea and Court, Julius Inequality, Growth and Poverty in the Era of Liberalization and Globalization, WIDER Policy Brief, No. 4, Helsinki: United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research, 2001, 12. Accessed June 14, 2010, wider. unu. edupublicationspolicy-briefsenGBpb4files788. 34 Piketty, Thomas and Saez, Emmanuel, Income Inequality in the United States, 1913 to 1978, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 8467, USA, 2001, Accessed August 22, 2010, nber. orgpapersw8467.pdf 35 Sherman, Aloc. and Stone, Chad. Income gaps between very rich and everyone else more than tripled in last three decades, Center on Budget amp Policy Priorities, USA, June 25, 2010, Accessed August 4, 2010, cbpp. orgfiles6-25-10inc. pdf 36 Krugman, Paul. The Rich, the Right, and the Facts, The American Prospect, 11 (1992): 19-31. 37 Stiglitz, Joseph E. Sen, Amartya and Fitoussi, Jean-Paul, Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress, 2009,8, Accessed August 4, 2010, stiglitz-sen-fitoussi. frdocumentsrapportanglais. pdf 38 Yates, Michael, Poverty and Inequality in the Global Economy, Monthly Review, 55 (2004):9. Accessed February 14, 2010, monthlyreview. org0204yates. htm 39 Yates, Michael, Naming the System: Inequality and Work in the Global Economy, New York: Monthly Review Press, 2003, 58-60, quote from Peter Montague, Economic Inequality and Health. 40 International Labour Organization. World of Work Report 2008: Income Inequalities in the Age of Financial Globalization, International Institute for Labour Studies: Geneva, Switzerland, 2008, 2, 23. Accessed July 28, 2010. 41 Wilkinson, R. and Pickett, K, The Spirit Level: Why Equality is Better for Everyone, Penguin: London, UK, 2009. 42 Aguayo-Rico, A. Guerra-Turrubiates, I. A. Montes, R. Empirical Evidence of the Impact of Health on Economic Growth, Issues in Political Economy, 14 (2005). Accessed June 4, 2010, org. elon. eduipeaguayorico20final. pdf 43 Camdessus, Michael. Opening Remarks, International Monetary Fund, June 1, 1995, Accessed July 7, 2010, imf. orgexternalnpsecmds1995mds9509.htm 44 Ramcharan and Rodney, Inequality Is Untenable, Finance amp Development, 47 (2010), IMF, September 2010. 45 Rivera, B. and Currais, L. The Effect of Health Investment on Growth: A Causality Analysis, IAER, 9 (2003): 312-324. 46 Fogel, R. W. Nutrition, Physiological Capital, and Economic Growth. Presented at Senior Policy Seminar on Health, Human Capital and Economic Growth: Theory, Evidence and Policies of the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) and Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), Washington, DC, USA, October 2002. Accessed June 3, 2010, paho. orgEnglishHDPHDDfogel. pdf 47 Bloom, D. E. Canning, D. Sevilla, J. The Effect of Health on Economic Growth: A Production Function Approach, World Development, 32 (2004): 32, 1-13. 48 Bloom, D. E. Canning, D. The Health and Wealth of Nations, Science, 287 (2000): 1207-1209. 49 Reich, Robert B. How to End the Recession, The New York Times, Sept. 2, 2010. Accessed August 4, 2010, nytimes20100903opinion03reich. html 50 For incisive analysis of inequality and its economic consequences: X. Sala-and-Martin The World Distribution of Income - Falling Poverty and Convergence Period, Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 2006 B. Milanovic, Worlds Apart: Measuring International and Global Inequality, Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, 2005 Where in the world are you, World Bank Working Paper, Dec 2007 and An even higher global inequality than previously thought, Dec 2007. 51 Oman, William. Does income inequality increase economic and financial instability Global Policy Journal, September 6, 2010. Accessed September 5, 2010, globalpolicyjournalblog06092010does-income-inequalit. 52 Lipsky, John, Financial Market Turbulence and Global Imbalances, Conference on European Economic Integration, IMF, November 19, 2007. Accessed July 5, 2010, imf. orgexternalnpspeeches2007111907.htm 53 Lauricella, Tom. and Dave Kansas. Currency Trading Soars, Wall Street Journal, Sept 1, 2010. Accessed August 6, 2010, online. wsjarticleSB1000142405274870442110457546390197351049. 54 International Development Economics Association. Globalisation and Income Inequality: A Survey. Accessed August 14, 2010, wwwworkideas. orgfeathmaug2002ft19GlobalisationSurvey. htm 55 Giving USA Foundation, U. S. Charitable Giving Estimated to Be 307.65 Billion in 2008, Accessed August 10, 2010, philanthropy. iupui. eduNews2009docsGivingReaches300billion. 56 Lee, Marc. The global Divide: Inequality in the World economy, Behind the Numbers, Economic Facts Figures and Analysis, 4 (2002). 57 Cornia, Giovanni Andrea and Kiiski, Sampsa, Trends in Income Distribution in the Post-World War II Period: Evidence and Interpretation, WIDER Discussion Paper, No. 89, Helsinki: United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research, 2001. 58 Wolf, Martin, The Big Lie of Global Inequality, Financial Times, February 8, 2000. 59 UNDP, Human Development Report 1999, United Nations Development Programme. Accessed July 13, 2010, hdr. undp. orgenmediaHDR1999EN. pdf 60 Cornia and Court, op. cit. p. 12-22. 61 Barro, Robert J. Inequality and Growth in a Panel of Countries, Journal of Economic Growth, 5(2000): 5-32. Accessed August 10, 2010, economics. harvard. edufacultybarrofilespinequalitygrw. pdf 62 Jorgenson, D. W. Consumer Behaviour and the Measurement of Social Welfare, Econometrica, 58(1990): 1007-1040. 63 Chaudury, Sunil, Global Encyclopaedia of Welfare Economics, New Delhi: Global Vision Publishing House, 2009, 144-145. 64 UNDP, Human Development Report 2006, United Nations Development Programme, p. 335. 66 Ryscavage, Paul, Rethinking the Income Gap, New Jersey. Transaction Publishers, 2009, 31. 67 Mukhopadhaya, Pundarik, Efficiency Criteria and the Sen-type Social Welfare Function, Working Paper, No. 0114, Department of Economics, National University. 68 Rajan, Raghuram, Fault Lines, Princeton University Press, 2010, 183. 69 Cornia and Court, op. cit. p. 27-28. 70 Gini values have been developed to measure both pre-tax and after-tax inequality. As far as possible, the Gini values used in this study are the after-tax values, since the objective is to measure the impact of inequality after taking into account transfers to and from government. 71 Wray, Randall, Full Employment Through Direct Job Creation, Webcast presentation to the World Academy of Art amp Science, November 10, 2009. Accessed June 30, 2010, worldacademy. orgfilesJob20Guarantee20Wray20presentation. 72 ILO maintains a database of estimated underemployment in many countries, results ranged from a low of 1.1 of total employment time in USA to 13.9 in Argentina. Studies of specific groups and locales cannot accurately assess the larger problem. Even this data is not available for many countries. 73 Mitchell, William and L. Randall Wray, Full Employment through Job Guarantee: A Response to Critics, CFEPS Working Paper 39, Center for Full Employment amp Equity, University of Newcastle, Australia, Jan 2005, 9. Accessed July 29, 2010, e1.newcastle. edu. aucoffeepubswp200404-13.pdf 74 Planning Commission, Special Group on Targeting Ten Million Employment Opportunities per Year, Government of India, 2002, 134. 75 International Labour Organization, op. Cit. p.115. 76 Semuals, Alana, For Many Unemployed Workers, Jobs Arent Coming Back, Los Angeles Times, Sept. 5, 2010. Accessed August 4, 2010, articles. latimes2010sep05businessla-fi-america-unemploym. 77 Rich, Motoko, For the Unemployed Over 50, Fears of Never Working Again, New York Times, Sept. 19, 2010. 78 McCurry, Justin, Japan Launches Nationwide Search for Centenarians, Guardian, Aug 3, 2010. Accessed August 13, 2010, guardian. co. ukworld2010aug03japan-centenarians-search 79 The adoption of a 66 cut-off ratio is based on the assumption that not everyone needs to or wants to work, even if attractive opportunities for gainful employment are available. Some may prefer to stay at home with family, volunteer or pursue interests which do not lend themselves to monetary reward. What constitutes real full employment may vary over time and between countries and cultures. Until more adequate measures are available, a somewhat arbitrary cutoff is necessary to avoid exaggerating the value of this indicator. In 2005, Korea registered the highest EPR among OECD countries in our sample. Most OECD countries recorded a downward trend, e. g. Swedens EPR 25 declined from 68 in 1990 to 59 in 2005. Japans fell from 67 to 58. According to ILO 70 developing countries have an EPR of 66 or higher. Since in most of these cases very high EPR reflects a high level of casual, informal or seasonal labour, EPR may not be a useful measure for monitoring progress in these countries. Therefore, we have adopted the lower norm of OECD countries as more representative of full utilization of human capital. 80 The ILO data does not have an upper age cut-off limit, so it includes all those who continue to work or seek employment upto and beyond the age of 65. 81 Ravi, Ranjani. Measuring Full Employment, MSS Research Working Paper, The Mothers Service Society, September 2010. Accessed July 28, 2010, mssresearch. orgqMeasuringFullEmployment . 82 Glaeser, E. G. Education Last Century, and Economic Growth Today, The New York Times, October 2009. Accessed September 1, 2010, economix. blogs. nytimes20091020education-last-century-and-. 83 Card, D. The Causal Effect of Education on Earnings, Chapter 30. In Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume 3, Ashenfelter, Card, D. pp. 1801-1859. Accessed September 1, 2010, emlab. berkeley. eduuserscardpaperscausaleducearnings. pdf 84 Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and Development, Human Development Report 2009, UNDP. Accessed September 1, 2010, hdr. undp. orgenmediaHDR2009Tablesrev. xls . 85 Education Pays, Bureau of Labor Statistics, United States Department of Labor. Accessed September 4, 2010, bls. govempemptab7.htm. (Data is based on weekly median earnings of full-time wage and salary workers in 2006.) 86 Unemployment rates and educational attainment (2004), Table A8.2b, Education at a glance, OECD, 2006. Accessed September 6, 2010, statlinks. oecdcode. org962006061P1-A8.XLS 87 The returns to education: education and earnings (2004), Table A9, Education at a glance, OECD, 2006. Accessed September 9, 2010, statlinks. oecdcode. org962006061P1-A9.XLS 88 National Center for Educational Statistics, PISA 2006: Performance of U. S. 15-Year-Old Students in Science and Mathematics Literacy in an International Context, 2007, p. Accessed September 13, 2010, nces. ed. govpubs20082008016.pdf. nces. ed. govpubs20082008. 90 Filmer, D. A. Hasan. and L. Pritchett, A Millennium Learning Goal: Measuring Real Progress in Education, Center for Global Development Working Paper 97, 2006, 5-6. 91 Greene, Jay P. High School Graduation Rates in the United States, Civic Report of the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, Nov 2001. Accessed July 29, 2010, manhattan-institute. orghtmlcrbaeo. htm 92 UNDP, Combined Gross Enrollment rates Data Tables for HDI Education Index. Accessed August 4, 2010, hdrstats. undp. orgenindicators90.html 93 Remeasuring the HDI by Data Envelopment Method, Interim Report of the International Institute of Applied System Analysis. Austria, 2001.8. Accessed on September 5, 2010, iiasa. ac. atAdminPUBDocumentsIR-01-069.pdf 94 UNDPs CGER apportions the following weightage in their CGER (Gross Enrollment Ratio primary education 717) (Gross Enrollment Ratio secondary education 517) Gross Enrollment Ratio tertiary education 517). For CEI, we increase the weightage of tertiary by an additional 21. 95 National Center for Educational Statistics, US Dept of Education, Accessed August 15, 2010, nces. ed. govfastfactsdisplay. aspid65 96 Max-Neff, M. A. Economic growth and quality of life: a threshold hypothesis, Ecological Economics, 15(1995): 115-118. 97 In Pursuit of Happiness Research. Is it Reliable What does it imply for Policy, The Cato institute, April 2007 tor Vergata Conference on Subjective Well-Being. 98 M. Degutis et al. Relation between GDP and life satisfaction in the EU, Ekonomika, 89 (2010): 9- 21. C. Bjornskov et al. Analysing Trends In Subjective Well-Being In 15 European Countries, Journal Of Happiness Studies, 9 (2008): 317-330. Bruno S. Frey. And A. Stutzer. Happiness And Economics, Princeton Univ. Drücken Sie. 2001. 99 IISP Report 2003. International Index of Social Progress, 5th International Conference of the International Society for Life Quality Studies, 15-17 November 1998, Baltimore, Maryland, USA. 100 Stiglitz et al. op. Cit. p. 66-67. 101 Based on Data Tables from International Energy Agency, Accessed August 23, 2010, eia. doe. gov 103 Methodology and data analysis for the Energy Efficiency Index, Saraswathi Mukkai and Ranjani Ravi, Research Methodology and Data for a Fossil Fuel Energy Index, MSS Research Working Paper, The Mothers Service Society, September 2010. Available online mssresearch. orgqResearchMethodologyandDataforaFossilFue. 104 Computations of GDP based on the expenditure method provide the essential information required to calculate HWE. Data for net household savings and PDI is more difficult to obtain for many developing countries. Until more accurate national accounts are available, HWE is taken as a rough approximation for PDI at the national level and consumption inequality as a rough approximation for income inequality. 105 Research data on specific countries. MSS Research Working Paper, The Mothers Service Society, September 2010. Available online mssresearch. orgqHEWI-Human-Economic-Welfare-Index-Country-Studies . 106 International Energy Agency data for GDP per unit of energy consumed and World Bank data for GDP (PPP). Accessed August 20, 2010, eia. doe. govpubinternationaliealftablee1p. xls
No comments:
Post a Comment